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1609 
REVERSING THE RELIANCE REVOLUTION IN 
CONTRACT 
Eric Alden* 
Abstract: During the past century, leading American academics have attempted to rewrite 
in radically altered form the theoretical foundation of liability in contract. In derogation of the 
historical bases for contractual liability in Anglo-American law, namely voluntary mutual 
exchange and “formal” contract, these intellectual revolutionaries desire to impose strict 
liability in contract on the basis of unilateral, unbargained-for reliance. 
The centerpiece of this revisionist effort has been the novel and artificial doctrine of 
“promissory estoppel,” first advanced by Williston and Corbin in the Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts published in 1932. The invention of this doctrine has been accompanied by related 
conceptual developments across the spectrum of academic scholarship and other articulations 
of contract law. 
On the basis of the relevant history, this Article argues that the historical and proper 
foundations of liability in contract are mutual exchange and formal contract rather than naked, 
unilateral reliance on informal promise in the absence of exchange. A return to the historical 
foundations of contract would repudiate the century-long effort from within academia 
artificially to alter this field of law. 
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Error, indeed, is never set forth in its naked deformity, lest, being thus 
exposed, it should at once be detected. But it is craftily decked out in an 
attractive dress, so as, by its outward form, to make it appear to the 
inexperienced . . . more true than the truth itself.1 
                                                                                     —Irenaeus of Lyons 
 
The past was erased, the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth.2 
                                                                                     —George Orwell  
                                                     
1. IRENAEUS OF LYONS, ADVERSUS HAERESES [AGAINST HERESIES] bk. I, preface (c. 175-185 
A.D.), in 1 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS 315, 315 (A. Cleveland Coxe ed., Alexander Roberts & James 
Donaldson trans., Buffalo, N.Y., Christian Literature Publ’g Co. 1885). The quoted passage relates to 
Irenaeus’ criticism of the theological assertions of the early gnostics. 
2. GEORGE ORWELL [ERIC ARTHUR BLAIR], 1984 [originally published as NINETEEN EIGHTY-
FOUR] 75 (1949). 
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INTRODUCTION 
An intellectual struggle has been in progress for now close to a century 
over the doctrinal foundation, and thus future, of American contract law. 
Arrayed on one side are those voices, those intellects, of the past who over 
the better part of a millennium erected the structure of Anglo-American 
contract law founded upon the enforcement of mutually agreed exchange 
and so-called “formal” contract. Taking the field against them are leading 
modern academics, undeclared revolutionaries who, commencing with 
the project to draft the initial Restatement of the Law of Contracts (First 
Restatement) in the 1920s,3 and continuing with the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts drafted in the 1960s and 1970s,4 have attempted to efface that 
history and effectuate a tectonic shift in the field of contract law to reward 
reliance irrespective of whether exchange is present. The principal, 
though not only, expression of this revolutionary reliance principle is the 
novel and largely artificial doctrine of “promissory estoppel,” which 
purports to impose potential liability for unfulfilled “promise” even 
though no consideration has been given therefor.5 
As conceived and drafted by Samuel Williston of Harvard Law School 
in the First Restatement,6 the doctrine of promissory estoppel makes no 
mention of either mutual consideration or mutual agreement between the 
parties.7 It thus purports to sweep aside as unnecessary, indeed irrelevant, 
the two fundamental requisites for the existence of contract under classical 
rules. Its alleged principle of liability requires no more, really, than the 
                                                     
3. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
5. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1932); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The term “promissory estoppel” was first 
coined by Professor Samuel Williston in his major treatise published shortly before the First 
Restatement project was undertaken. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 308 
(Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1924) (1920) [hereinafter WILLISTON TREATISE] (Williston’s copyright on the 
treatise was 1920; printed publication of the multiple volumes occurred over several years, resulting 
in Baker, Voorhis and Co.’s 1924 date here). Although Williston set forth his substantive concept of 
promissory estoppel in Section 90 of the First Restatement, he did not use the “promissory estoppel” 
moniker whatsoever to describe that concept in the First Restatement itself. Even in the Restatement 
(Second), which appeared a number of decades later, the term “promissory estoppel” arises sotto voce 
in a comment to Section 90, rather than as an actual section title. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 90, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
6. On Williston’s role as the individual who first coined the term “promissory estoppel,” personally 
drafted the text of Section 90, and served as the principal advocate thereof during the First 
Restatement drafting process, see Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L.J. 659, 661 
n.2, 663 n.13, 664–68 (2016). 
7. Indeed, in the First Restatement the doctrine of promissory estoppel appeared under a heading 
explicitly entitled “Informal Contracts Without Assent or Consideration.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS ch. 3, topic 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
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foreseeability of reliance by another: “A promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise.”8 
Historically, liability in contract is strict—that is, does not require 
culpable conduct—but does require mutual consideration, mutual 
exchange. By contrast, liability in tort is generally not strict, inasmuch as 
negligence or more culpable conduct is typically required for the 
imposition of liability.9 Promissory estoppel embarks upon terra nova, 
purporting to impose liability founded upon neither mutual exchange nor 
upon harmful negligence or other culpable conduct. It is thus neither fish 
nor fowl, neither contract—properly viewed—nor traditional culpability-
based tort. Rather, despite having been packaged and marketed by 
Williston as a supplement to contract, promissory estoppel in truth 
constitutes a newfound and essentially unprecedented strict liability tort 
for unfulfilled promise.10 
As trenchantly observed by Grant Gilmore of Yale Law School in the 
1970s, this radically new principle of liability for unfulfilled promise 
stands not just in stark contrast to, but in literal abnegation of, the rules 
and requirements of traditional contract law.11 They are mutually 
exclusive, “matter and anti-matter,” “Contract and anti-Contract.”12 
Promissory estoppel literally denies the two core, essential requirements 
for the imposition of contractual liability, namely mutual consideration 
and mutual agreement. Over time, one or the other principle will win out. 
“The one thing that is clear,” Gilmore wrote, “is that these two 
contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in the end 
one must swallow the other up.”13 Our society will either return to 
classical rules of contract, or promissory estoppel will metastasize ever 
further, ultimately supplanting the principle that one must pay for that 
which one wishes to receive with a fundamentally new principle, namely 
                                                     
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For discussion of the 
manner in which the “should reasonably expect” language functionally serves as no more than the 
traditional requirement of foreseeability in tort, see Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra 
note 6, at 672. 
9. In certain discrete exceptions, tort liability applies on a strict basis, such as for harm arising from 
the use of dynamite and, as a more modern innovation, harm arising from product defects. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(blasting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (product 
liability). For obvious reason, tort does not require consideration. 
10. See Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 671–74. 
11. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61 (1974). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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that one need not pay, rather only rely. Gilmore welcomed that latter 
prospect. The Author, and this Article, do not. 
The objective of this Article is therefore to illuminate the conceptual 
battlefield and to argue for a return to the principles which have animated 
contract law since the earliest days of Anglo-American civilization. The 
objective is to reverse the reliance revolution in contract. 
The heart of this endeavor lies in close examination of the relevant legal 
and intellectual history—how the rules and requirements of contract 
developed, and how the doctrine of promissory estoppel was conceived 
and advocated. Detailed knowledge of that history is indispensable in 
order correctly to evaluate and judge the genesis, justification, and 
advisability of the antithetical legal principles here at issue. 
Accordingly, Part I reviews the historical development and contours of 
the rules of contract from the Norman invasion of England through the 
American revolution, by which time Anglo-American contract law had 
largely assumed its modern shape. Part II explores the intellectual history 
of the reliance concept and attempts by academics during the twentieth 
century to undermine the requirement of consideration for the 
enforceability of contract. Part III looks to those changes required to 
return contract law to its traditional and proper configuration. This would 
entail, inter alia, more robust application of the concept of implied 
unilateral contract, as well as more rigorous grappling with the issue of 
whether in any given case a sufficiently definite “promise” has in fact 
been made. It would also entail returning the American Law Institute’s 
restatement to a doctrinal description bearing greater fidelity to the true 
record of history and precedent. The Article then concludes. 
I. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW 
In proposing that his radical new principle of promissory liability be 
included in the First Restatement—misleadingly held out as merely 
reciting “the law as it is, not as a new law”14—Williston was at pains to 
present his novum as enjoying precedential legitimacy. His two central 
claims were that the origins of Anglo-American contract law in the 
Middle Ages rested upon what was essentially promissory estoppel, and 
that various latter-day cases setting forth exceptions to the consideration 
requirement should be expanded into promissory estoppel’s universal 
                                                     
14. Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, 3 A.L.I. PROC. 82, 159 (1925). 
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exception to the requirement.15 The latter claim shall be addressed infra.16 
The prior is addressed here. 
A. The Foundations: 1066 to 1350 
Anglo-American contract law originally developed in medieval 
England following the Norman conquest in 1066.17 Unlike continental 
Europe, which began during the Middle Ages consciously to pattern its 
laws on those of ancient Rome, England followed a semi-autonomous 
path of legal development under the Normans, clearly informed by certain 
Roman legal concepts yet charting its own distinct path forward.18 Our 
own American contract law of today descends directly from the 
fundamental legal structures crafted by the British during the half 
millennium from 1066 to 1602.19 
In brief, during the earliest phases of Anglo-American contract law, 
vast numbers of day-to-day commercial exchange transactions were 
enforced pursuant to what was referred to at the time as “debt upon 
contract.”20 In such claims, one party had, pursuant to mutual agreement, 
conveyed property to or performed a service for another, or paid another 
for a property or service, and the counterparty had then failed to render 
their agreed-upon counterperformance.21 The party which had already 
performed their side of the exchange could then bring suit.22 Such 
                                                     
15. See Eric Alden, Promissory Estoppel and the Origins of Contract Law, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 1, 10–
12 (2017) [hereinafter Alden, Origins of Contract Law]; Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 
supra note 6, at 678–705. 
16. See infra section II.C.2.a. 
17. See generally JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (4th ed. 2007); 
JOHN H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750 
(1986) [hereinafter SOURCES]; C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT 
AND CONTRACT (1949); WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 2 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (4th ed. 1936); 
S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1981); THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956) (1929); 1–2 FREDERICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF 
EDWARD I (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1968) (1895) [hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; A.W.B. 
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1975); SAMUEL JACOB STOLJAR, A 
HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW (1975). 
18. This was of course due in no small part to the geographic and thus cultural separation afforded 
by the English Channel. On the semi-autonomous nature of English legal development, see 
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 193; PLUCKNETT, supra note 17, at 298–99. As to the 
influence of Roman legal concepts upon the development of early English law, see Alden, Origins of 
Contract Law, supra note 15, at 35–42. 
19. See discussion infra section I.C. 
20. See STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
21. Id.; see BAKER, supra note 17, at 318–25. 
22. See STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 11. 
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contracts did not need to be in writing to be enforceable—all that was 
required was that the plaintiff have rendered their own performance as a 
precondition to seeking legal remedy.23 These were contracts predicated 
on voluntary mutual exchange. 
Distinct from such actions sounding in debt upon contract were two 
principal species of so-called “formal” contract, in which one party would 
make a formal promise to another in a manner characterized by high 
evidential quality. These two species of formal contract were, 
respectively, “debt upon obligation” and “covenant.”24 
In debt upon obligation, one party would acknowledge in a formal, 
“sealed” writing—in the parlance of the day, a “deed”—that the party 
owed a specified sum of money to another.25 The high formality of 
crafting a document written on parchment, sealed with melted wax, not 
infrequently accompanied by ribbons, and stamped with a personally 
customized seal die26—in a day and age when many could neither read 
nor write proficiently27 and the instruments for creating such documents 
were presumably often not at hand—served a severalfold purpose. It 
demonstrated conclusively to third parties for evidential purposes that a 
contractual “promise” had in fact been made.28 It set forth in writing the 
precise contours of the promise, not subject to either outright mendacity 
or the vagaries of ex post memory tainted by the motivation of self-
interest.29 And it served an admonitory function, putting the promisor on 
notice of the contractually binding nature of the obligation thus 
undertaken. 
Though deeds acknowledging a monetary debt were presumably 
written overwhelmingly in circumstances where the nominal debtor had 
in fact received value in exchange therefor—why, after all, would one 
                                                     
23. Id. 
24. See id. at 4–10; BAKER, supra note 17, at 318–25. 
25. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 323. 
26. On the physical mechanics of seals, see generally P.D.A. HARVEY & ANDREW MCGUINNESS, 
A GUIDE TO BRITISH MEDIEVAL SEALS (1996). 
27. Milsom characterized this earlier period in our history as “a largely illiterate age.” MILSOM, 
supra note 17, at 248. For a brief overview discussion of the incremental growth of literacy and the 
impact of written documents in medieval England even prior to Gutenberg’s invention of the printing 
press circa 1440, see Nazareth A. M. Pantaloni III, Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the 
Legal Order, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 679, 682, 684–87 (1994), though it has been estimated that by the 1600s 
still only one third of English men were literate. Allegra di Bonaventura, Beating the Bounds: 
Property and Perambulation in Early New England, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115, 144 (2007). 
28. This is distinct from those run-of-the-mill, forward-looking statements of anticipation or intent 
which every one of us utters many times a day without any expectation—by either speaker or 
listener—that the statement would have any legally binding effect. 
29. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 220. 
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formally acknowledge that one is indebted for a fixed sum of money to 
another if one has not actually received anything?—the deed was of such 
“‘high nature’ for evidential purposes” that inquiry into the specifics of 
the exchange was not required.30 The party issuing the deed had, as it 
were, signaled an absolute intent to be bound and effectively waived the 
proof of counterperformance that would be requisite, for example, in an 
informal action of debt upon contract. Debt upon obligation, evidenced by 
such a deed, was formal contract. 
Similarly, one could enter into any other manner of future-oriented 
promise and render it enforceable by creating a formal, sealed deed. This 
was known as covenant.31 Again, though such formal promises may 
overwhelmingly have been entered into in exchange for some delivered 
or promised counterperformance,32 the “‘high nature’ for evidential 
purposes”33 of the deed rendered technical inquiry into 
counterperformance unnecessary. This was likewise formal contract, not 
entirely dissimilar to the formal stipulatio of ancient Rome.34 
The foregoing description sets forth the main lines of Anglo-American 
contract law in its earliest formulation during the centuries following the 
Norman conquest.35 Exchange contracts were enforceable, with or 
without a writing, as long as the plaintiff had rendered their own 
performance. Formal contracts, even if reflecting underlying exchange 
transactions—as they presumably typically did—due to their high 
evidential nature obviated the need to inquire into the counterparty’s 
counterperformance or counterpromise. 
B. Procedural Shift: 1350 to 1600 
Between roughly 1350 and 1600, English contract law then underwent 
a gradual change in the procedural mechanism used to bring contract suits. 
Whereas theretofore the actions of debt upon contract and debt upon 
obligation had constituted the principal avenues for contract litigation in 
                                                     
30. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 324–25; STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 9. 
31. See FIFOOT, supra note 17, at 255–58. 
32. See STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 38. 
33. BAKER, supra note 17, at 324. 
34. Stipulatio was oral rather than written, but it followed a prescribed formula of counterpart 
recitations before a witness. See MILSOM, supra note 17, at 249; PLUCKNETT, supra note 17, at 632. 
35. The description given here reflects the law of contract as practiced in the King’s courts as 
distinct from local courts. For example, local courts in London did not require specialty (a formal 
deed) for the enforcement of covenant. See John H. Baker, Deeds Speak Louder than Words: 
Covenants and the Law of Proof, 1290–1321, in LAWS, LAWYERS AND TEXTS: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL 
HISTORY IN HONOUR OF PAUL BRAND 177, 177–78 (Susanne Jenks et al. eds., 2012); SIMPSON, supra 
note 17, at 16. 
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the King’s central courts, debt upon contract was burdened with a severe 
and often crippling weakness from plaintiff’s point of view: The 
defendant in a debt upon contract case could simply deny, upon 
defendant’s faith, the existence of the debt or duty to render 
counterperformance.36 Known as “wager of law,” this could consist of 
either an assertion that no money, property, or services had in fact been 
received by the defendant, or that the defendant had already paid or 
rendered counterperformance therefor.37 In either case, the defendant 
would not be under any current contractual obligation. If the defendant 
could pull together a dozen “compurgators” likewise willing to swear that 
they believed defendant’s assertion, the defendant was absolved of 
liability.38 
This extraordinary, and by today’s standard antiquated, primitive 
defense created an enormous incentive for plaintiffs, and for judges 
seeking justice in cases where defendant’s denial seemed suspect, to 
search for an alternative “writ,” or procedural form of action, by which to 
bring contract suits.39 The candidate upon which they landed was the tort 
writ of trespass upon the case sounding in assumpsit, or simply 
“assumpsit” for short. 
In its original, early form, the plaintiff’s essential allegation in 
assumpsit was that the defendant had assumed an obligation to do 
something, and then through negligence in the performance thereof—a 
“neglect” in the terminology of the day—brought harm to the plaintiff or 
plaintiff’s property.40 Founded upon negligence, this early form of 
assumpsit sounded in tort. 
Given its origin in negligence, thus a nonconsensual harm to plaintiff, 
rather than in mutually agreed exchange, assumpsit had a cardinal 
advantage over debt upon contract as a vehicle for plaintiff’s claim—the 
defendant in an assumpsit claim could not skirt liability by waging their 
law.41 A plaintiff choosing to bring their claim in debt upon contract might 
find themselves frustrated by defendant’s wager of law, but if the claim 
could somehow be formulated in a manner permitting use of the writ of 
assumpsit, that defense fell away entirely. 
                                                     
36. See MILSOM, supra note 17, at 254; STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
37. See STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 8. 
38. Id. 
39. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 326–27. 
40. See Bukton v. Tounesende (1348), record at KB 27/354 m. 85, report at YB 22 Ass. 94, pl. 41 
(KB), translated in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 358; alternative translation of record at 82 SELDEN 
SOCIETY 66 (1965) [hereinafter The Humber Ferry Case]. 
41. See, e.g., STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 78. 
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Through creative application and extension over the next two centuries, 
the writ of assumpsit eventually came to be applicable not only to cases 
involving negligence, that is, malfeasance, but also to cases where 
defendant simply failed to perform what was promised, that is, 
nonfeasance.42 Assumpsit thus left its tortious origin behind, ultimately 
becoming applicable across nearly the entire spectrum of contract 
disputes.43 Yet though no longer founded upon negligence, the contractual 
use of assumpsit conveniently retained its profound procedural advantage 
of permitting plaintiffs to circumvent the wager of law defense available 
to defendants in actions sounding in debt upon contract. Plaintiffs and 
sympathetic judges accordingly flocked to the new form of action.44 This 
evolution came to its dramatic conclusion with the epochal Slade’s Case 
of 1602, by virtue of which the availability of assumpsit to plaintiff even 
in cases where the action might otherwise have been brought pursuant to 
a writ of debt was now extended from the King’s Bench to Common Pleas 
as well.45 As a result, the wager of law defense was rendered effectively a 
dead letter. 
Yet precisely during the time period in which assumpsit was brought 
into play and expanded to cover all manner of contractual disputes, the 
English courts articulated a hard, absolute rule for the use of assumpsit in 
contract: There must be “consideration” for the promise to be enforced—
that is, there must be an exchange between the parties.46 An 
uncompensated promise was nothing more than that, and not enforceable 
at law.47 Only if the promise were rendered in exchange for a mutually 
                                                     
42. For a condensed review of the grand sweep of these developments, see generally Alden, Origins 
of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 28–53. 
43. Id. 
44. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 343. 
45. Slade v. Morley (1602), decision at BL MS. Add. 25203, fol. 607 (QB) (Eng.), together with: 
(i) KB 27/1336, m. 305; (ii) Exchequer Chamber, Mich. (1597): Dodderidge’s speech from LI MS. 
Maynard 55, fol. 246; and BL MS. Harley 6809, fol. 45; Coke’s reply from BL MS. Hargrave 5, fol. 
67v; (iii) Serjeant’s Inn, Mich. (1598): BL MS. Add. 25203, fol. 12; (iv) Serjeant’s Inn (1602): BL 
MS. Add. 25203, fol. 496; and (v) Coke’s retrospective summary: 4 Co. Rep. 92; collated with Coke’s 
autograph report, BL MS. Harley 6686, ff. 526–530v; reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 420 
[all of the foregoing collectively hereinafter Slade’s Case]. The specific issue in Slade’s Case was 
whether assumpsit could be used by a plaintiff as the basis for an action if debt upon contract were 
also available on the facts. The Court of Common Pleas said no; the King’s Bench had said yes. 
Slade’s Case resolved the matter in favor of the King’s Bench position. See Alden, Origins of 
Contract Law, supra note 15, at 49–51. 
46. Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 49–51. 
47. An uncompensated promise was referred to as nudum pactum, i.e., a naked pact. This short 
phrase came from a longer Latin sentence, nudum pactum non parit actionem (a naked pact does not 
give grounds for an action), along with substantively identical Latin grammatical variants of the same, 
such as ex nudo pacto nulla oritur actio. The principle that an uncompensated promise was not 
enforceable was a point frequently made, often using the Latin, in English sources at the time. See, 
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agreed counterperformance, or reciprocal promise of future 
counterperformance, could the promise be enforced in the courts. Thus, 
assumpsit was transmogrified into a form of action centrally founded upon 
the same essential criterion as debt upon contract, namely the presence of 
a mutually agreed exchange.48 Exchange contract remained exchange 
contract. Only the procedural form through which the action was brought 
had changed.49 
In the aftermath of this evolution, a claim in assumpsit could still, as in 
early days, be predicated upon nonconsensual harm to the plaintiff, i.e., 
negligence, a tort, or it could alternatively be predicated upon failure to 
carry out a mutually agreed exchange.50 Tortious assumpsit remained 
viable, but contractual assumpsit had sprung up beside it. A mere promise, 
however, in the absence of exchange, and without tortious negligence, 
was simply not actionable. This history is, of course, incompatible with 
Williston’s later claim that contract law procedurally based on assumpsit 
in the late Middle Ages effectively constituted promissory estoppel, as 
will be discussed infra.51 
With the resolution of Slade’s Case in 1602, English law had at this 
juncture attained approximately its modern form. Though various 
substantial improvements and annexes would later be built onto the 
structure,52 the foundation, walls, and roof had been erected. Contract 
could be created either through mutual exchange or through the delivery 
of a highly formalized deed. 
                                                     
e.g., Question from the Master of the Rolls (1477) YB 17 Edw. 4, fol. 4, Trin., pl. 4 (Common Bench) 
(remarks of Townshend), translated in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 242 (discussing various situations 
in which a quid pro quo either would or would not be present); CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DYALOGE 
IN ENGLYSSHE/ BYTWYXT A DOCTOURE OF DYUYNYTE/ AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWES OF 
ENGLANDE [DOCTOR AND STUDENT], reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOCIETY 228 (1974) [hereinafter ST. 
GERMAN]; JOHN RASTELL, EXPOSITIONES TERMINORUM LEGUM ANGLIAE (circa 1525), reprinted in 
SOURCES, supra note 17, at 483 (alteration in original). For discussion of the origins of this Latin 
phrase, along with Roman law on point and its apparent transmission to medieval England, see Alden, 
Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 36–42. 
48. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 52–53. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 53. 
51. See infra section II.C. 
52. In 1677, Parliament enacted the Statute of Frauds, which imposed a writing requirement for the 
enforcement of certain categories of contracts viewed at the time as being significant in nature. Statute 
of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 445. In the 1800s, offer and 
acceptance mechanics were significantly built out. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 5. 
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C. Blackstone and Contract Law in America 
A mere five years later, in 1607, British settlers landed at Jamestown 
and shortly thereafter at Plymouth Rock. Contract law in the American 
colonies was thus from its very inception English contract law as it stood 
in the wake of Slade’s Case. That is, American contract law was founded 
upon exchange contract and formal contract, not promissory estoppel. 
The doctrinal statement of contract law widely used and considered 
definitive throughout the colonies on the eve of the American Revolution 
was set forth in William Blackstone’s magisterial Commentaries on the 
Laws of England published in the year 1765.53 His treatise stood astride 
the legal world of the time like a colossus, serving as the central point of 
reference for both English and American judges and lawyers.54 The 
portrait he rendered is of English contract law in settled form after the 
preceding centuries of development since the Norman conquest of 
England. 
Of signal importance is Blackstone’s emphasis on the absolute 
requirement of consideration, of mutual exchange, for the enforcement of 
contract. The Commentaries contain a chapter dealing with the law of 
gifts, grants and contracts.55 Therein, Blackstone defined “contract” as “an 
agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular 
thing.”56 “The civilians hold,” he stated, “that in all contracts, either 
express or implied, there must be something given in exchange, something 
that is mutual or reciprocal. This thing, which is the price or motive of the 
contract, we call the consideration . . . .”57 Blackstone was crystalline that 
consideration must be present as a precondition to the enforceability of 
promise: 
A consideration of some sort or other is so absolutely necessary 
to the forming of a contract, that a nudum pactum, or agreement 
to do or pay any thing on one side, without any compensation on 
the other, is totally void in law; and a man cannot be compelled 
to perform it.58 
                                                     
53. See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. 
54. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 17, at 287. 
55. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *440. 
56. Id. at *442. 
57. Id. at *444. 
58. Id. at *445. Despite this forceful statement of the general rule, there was in Blackstone’s 
presentation an anomaly with respect to the term “consideration” as applied to certain intrafamily 
donative promises, discussed infra section I.E, and two other regards in which Blackstone used the 
term “contract” to describe a gratuitous arrangement. As to these two latter, one was the gratuitous 
bailment, and the other was gratuitous borrowing. Limitations of space prohibit full discussion of 
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No clearer or more forceful statement of the doctrine of 
consideration—to which the latter-day, artificial doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is literally antithetical—could be imagined. These Commentaries 
set forth in definitive terms the state of English, and thus American, 
contract law at the birth of our country. 
D. The Anomalous Case of Intrafamily Donative Promises 
That being said, there existed a possible anomaly in the received 
doctrine of consideration as presented in Blackstone’s Commentaries with 
regard to intrafamily donative promises, i.e., a promise to make a gift to a 
family member not now, but in the future. Though this might at first blush 
appear to be an ancillary subject to touch upon, it later ended up playing 
a critical, indeed decisive, role in Williston’s invention of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in the early 1900s.59 
Under property law, a gift is generally effective upon actual transfer of 
an ownership interest.60 If, however, a putative donor merely promises to 
make a gift in the future, the general rule is that the gift has not yet 
occurred.61 As a promise is involved, the matter is then considered under 
contract law principles, where we have seen that the absence of 
consideration, the absence of exchange—and a gift is, tautologically, 
gratuitous—renders the promise unenforceable. Blackstone articulated 
the rule unambiguously: 
A true and proper gift or grant is always accompanied with 
delivery of possession, and takes effect immediately . . . . But if 
the gift does not take effect, by delivery of immediate possession, 
it is then not properly a gift, but a contract; and this a man cannot 
be compelled to perform, but upon good and sufficient 
consideration . . . .62 
So far, so good. Yet Blackstone’s presentation also contains a brief 
discussion of a distinction which at first blush, and again upon second 
                                                     
these here, but neither indicts or undermines his general statement of the requirement of consideration 
for all contracts. Gratuitous bailment, to address the first of these, is a highly particularized niche in 
the law which can and should be cabined off from contract law in general, and the principles on which 
it operates have been reabsorbed over the course of centuries back into tort rather than contract. See 
Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 688–92. 
59. See infra section II.C.4. 
60. For a statement of this rule at the birth of our country, see 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 
*441. For a modern statement thereof, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. p (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003). 
62. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *441–42. 
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blush, strikes one as contradictory to everything he had earlier said 
regarding consideration: 
A good consideration . . . is that of blood or natural affection 
between near relations; the satisfaction accruing from which the 
law esteems an equivalent for whatever benefit may move from 
one relation to another. This consideration may sometimes 
however be set aside, and the contract become void, when it tends 
in its consequences to defraud creditors, or other third persons, of 
their just rights. But a contract for any valuable consideration, as 
for marriage, for money, for work done, or for other reciprocal 
contracts, can never be impeached at law; and, if it be of a 
sufficient adequate value, is never set aside in equity; for the 
person contracted with has then given an equivalent in 
recompense, and is therefore as much an owner, or a creditor, as 
any other person.63 
In a purely gratuitous promise to a relative, the donee relative has done 
nothing affirmatively to convey a benefit upon the promisor, or at 
promisor’s request upon a third person. There is no bargain, no quid pro 
quo, no deal. The relative has thus paid no consideration for the promise. 
The promise is unenforceable. And yet we have Blackstone’s foregoing 
statement, apparently to the contrary. 
An explanation suggests itself. When we dig deeper into Blackstone’s 
text, we see that his central citation for this passage refers back to an 
earlier section of his treatise that this passage effectively repeats in 
substance.64 That earlier section spoke of the alienation of property by 
deed—that is, by formally sealed document.65 Blackstone specified that 
for such a deed to be enforced, it had to be based upon either valuable 
consideration, or upon “good” consideration.66 “A good consideration,” 
he wrote, “is such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when 
a man grants an estate to a near relation: being founded on motives of 
generosity, prudence, and natural duty . . . .”67 Blackstone was thus in 
effect stating that a gratuitous deed of transfer—i.e., one not founded upon 
valuable consideration—would only be enforced if made out to the benefit 
of one’s near relatives. A wholly gratuitous deed purporting to alienate 
property to some other party—not a relative—would, by negative 
                                                     
63. Id. at *444 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
64. Id. at *296–97. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at *297. 
67. Id. 
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inference from Blackstone’s explication, not be enforceable despite 
having been set forth in a formal, sealed writing. 
Moreover, Blackstone made clear that “[d]eeds made upon good 
consideration only [that is, not valuable consideration], are considered as 
merely voluntary, and are frequently set aside in favour of creditors, and 
bona fide purchasers.”68 He had thus distinguished a “merely voluntary,” 
in other words gratuitous, nonbinding, transfer, from one in which a party 
has incurred a legal obligation by virtue of which the counterparty 
becomes “as much an owner, or a creditor, as any other person.”69 
Thus, Blackstone’s text stated simply that even a gift deed must be 
founded upon some plausible motivation to benefit one’s family in order 
to be enforced. He had therefore not contradicted himself as to the 
requirement of valuable consideration in true, binding contract. 
Subsequent American case law is consistent with this interpretation of 
Blackstone’s intended meaning.70 
Nonetheless, Blackstone’s phraseology, presumably consistent with 
certain precedent upon which he drew, was confusing at best, and may 
over time have seduced more than a few into thinking that natural love 
and affection, standing on their own, might constitute “consideration” 
sufficient to render a gift promise binding.71 There did indeed exist a well-
                                                     
68. Id.  
69. Id. at *444. 
70. See Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 101 N.W. 852 (Mich. 1904). Though without citing Blackstone 
directly, Fischer addressed a gratuitous grant deed to real property, coupled with a gratuitous promise 
to pay off the associated mortgages, in terms very much along the lines suggested. “The deed [to a 
parcel of land] was a gift, and the gift was consummated by its execution and delivery. The title to 
the land . . . passed as against all except the grantor’s creditors,” wrote the court. Id. at 853. The court 
described three classes of “consideration”: (i) ”valuable consideration” sufficient to create 
enforceable contract; (ii) ”voluntary bounty,” which is “for all legal purposes a mere nullity until 
actual performance of the promise”; and (iii) an intermediate category involving “moral duty,” such 
as a promise for the purpose of “maintaining a wife and children.” Id. The court clearly distinguished 
between the term “consideration” used in its third, intermediate terminological category to support an 
executed and delivered gratuitous deed granting title to real property against potential claims by other 
noncreditor members of a family, versus the valuable consideration involved in enforceable executory 
contract: 
The consideration of natural love and affection is sufficient in a deed [that is, a fully executed 
and delivered gratuitous deed granting title to real property]; but a mere executory contract, that 
requires a consideration, as a promissory note, cannot be supported on the consideration of blood 
or natural love and affection—there must be something more, a valuable consideration, or it 
cannot be enforced at law . . . . 
Id. at 854 (quoting Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208 (Md. 1830)). 
71. Stoljar has written that “in the eighteenth century we again hear voices, though always few and 
isolated, claiming love and affection (or what is now called ‘moral obligation’) to be a sufficient basis 
or consideration for a promise to pay.” STOLJAR, supra note 17, at 67. 
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known case to that effect from the mid-1500s, Sharrington v. Strotton,72 
though this principle enunciated in Sharrington did not ultimately prevail 
as the case law developed.73 Over time, the firm rule articulated was that 
natural love and affection were not regarded as constituting 
consideration,74 for the obvious reason that they did not involve an 
exchange, a quid pro quo. A transfer based purely on love and affection 
and without exchange is gratuitous, and therefore is a gift. If no present 
transfer is effectuated, and only a future transfer contemplated, it is a gift 
promise and not enforceable. 
This subject will be reprised infra, when discussion turns to the genesis 
of promissory estoppel.75 
E. Atrophy of Formal Contract Pursuant to Seal 
In addition to the near universal case of contract formed by mutually 
agreed exchange, true to English legal history Blackstone’s 
Commentaries indicated that formal contract, created by the use of a seal, 
constituted a valid alternative method to create binding contractual 
obligation.76 
Over the course of American frontier history, however, there occurred 
a steady erosion in the formality, use, and effect of the seal to create 
formal contract.77 The old solemnity of red wax impressed with an 
individually distinctive seal die was gradually abandoned in favor of less 
formal and ultimately casual means of “sealing” a document.78 A stamped 
impression on the paper, or even simply words reciting that the document 
was “sealed,” came to be viewed as sufficient.79 Hand in hand with this 
relaxation of formality and concomitant decline in evidential quality of 
                                                     
72. Sharrington v. Strotton (1565) KB 27/1212, m. 253; Plowd. 298, 301, reprinted in SOURCES, 
supra note 17, at 488. 
73. See John H. Baker, Origins of the “Doctrine” of Consideration, 1535-1585, in ON THE LAWS 
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 336, 354 (Morris S. Arnold 
et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter Baker, Origins of Consideration] (stating that certain enumerated 
“seemingly unreciprocal considerations as natural love and affection” were “held good in their time, 
until they were struck down by the countervailing notion of reciprocity”). 
74. Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 110–
11 (2000). 
75. See infra section II.C.2.c. 
76. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *465. 
77. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 86–88 (2d ed. 1990); 1A ARTHUR LINTON 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF 
CONTRACT LAW 385–458 (1963). 
78. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, at 87; CORBIN, supra note 77, at 390–96. 
79. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, at 87. 
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the seal, many states by statute began to provide that a seal merely 
provided a presumption of consideration, abolished the distinction 
between sealed and unsealed documents, or abolished the seal outright.80 
The states in which the seal appears still to have life are generally those 
which numbered among the original thirteen colonies.81 New York, 
however, and other principal commercial jurisdictions of later vintage 
such as Illinois, California, and Texas, have all either abolished the 
distinction between sealed and unsealed, or abolished the seal altogether.82 
As will be seen later, this atrophy of the seal as a means of creating an 
enforceable promise, without further inquiry into whether consideration 
is in fact present, played a significant role in subsequent events. It largely 
removed from the legal arsenal a simple, straightforward means to address 
the presumably rare case in which an individual wishes not to make a 
present gift, but rather wishes to render legally enforceable against him or 
herself a present promise to make a gift or render gratuitous services in 
the future. The absence of a ready tool to hand for such unusual 
circumstances was later to be used by Samuel Williston as the principal 
justification for his advocacy in the early twentieth century of the novel 
doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
II. THE RELIANCE REVOLUTION 
A. Setting the Intellectual Stage 
We now arrive at the cusp of the modern era. Before turning to 
Williston’s advocacy for promissory estoppel in the 1920s, two preceding 
conceptual developments in the late 1800s and early 1900s must be 
addressed. Together, they contributed to obscuring the genesis and true 
foundation of contract law. 
1. Langdell’s Dismissal of Benefit to Promisor 
Christopher Columbus Langdell served as dean of Harvard Law School 
from 1870 to 1895, and in that capacity played a tremendously influential 
                                                     
80. Id. at 87–88. 
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 4, topic 3, stat. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(2016 update). 
82. Id. The seal has also been declared by the Uniform Commercial Code to be legally inoperative 
as to the sale of goods. U.C.C. § 2-203 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003) (“This 
section makes it clear that every effect of the seal which relates to ‘sealed instruments’ as such is 
wiped out insofar as contracts for sale are concerned.”). 
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role in the development of American legal education.83 He has generally 
been viewed as a principal exponent of archetypal classical contract law.84 
It is thus ironic that in Langdell’s treatise on the subject,85 his analysis 
of consideration should prove—presumably quite unintentionally86—to 
constitute a beachhead for subsequent efforts to shift the doctrinal 
underpinnings of the field away from mutual exchange and toward 
unilateral, unbargained-for reliance by the promisee. With no disrespect 
desired or intended to Langdell’s enormous personal and professional 
achievements, certain statements in his treatise must be critically 
addressed. 
In a section of the treatise entitled “To whom the Consideration must 
move,” we find Langdell make the following rather striking statement: 
[I]t is frequently laid down as a rule, that a consideration must 
consist of some benefit to the promisor or some detriment to the 
promisee, as if either one of these would do; and in applying this 
rule, it is a common practice to inquire first if there is a benefit to 
the promisor . . . . In truth, however, benefit to the promisor is 
irrelevant to the question whether a given thing can be made the 
consideration of a promise . . . . On the other hand, detriment to 
the promisee is a universal test of the sufficiency of consideration; 
i. e. every consideration must possess this quality, and, possessing 
this quality, it is immaterial whether it is a benefit to the promisor 
or not.87 
Upon a careful reading and parsing of this passage and others related 
thereto in Langdell’s treatise, one sees that he was attempting to make the 
narrow, technical point that one may bargain for an immediate, direct 
benefit (as distinct from the indirect benefit arising therefrom) to be 
conferred not back upon oneself but instead upon a third party, such as a 
family member, a friend, or a creditor under another preexisting contract, 
                                                     
83. As dean, Langdell innovated and introduced the case law method of law school instruction. As 
to the background for his ideas in this regard, see generally Bruce A. Kimball, Young Christopher 
Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189 (2002) 
(indicating the influence on Langdell of John Locke’s writing on educational methodology). 
84. See, e.g., Mark Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and 
Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 117, 119 (2006). 
85. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d 
ed. 1880). 
86. Langdell’s recitation of the doctrine of consideration is upon first impression every bit as 
orthodox as that of Blackstone: “The consideration of a promise is the thing given or done by the 
promisee in exchange for the promise. It is a familiar rule of law that contracts not under seal [i.e., all 
contracts not evidenced by a formally sealed deed] require a consideration to make them binding.” 
Id. at 58. 
87. Id. at 81–82 (emphasis added). 
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as will be elucidated below. Yet the extraordinarily broad phrasing used 
by Langdell has, in the hands of certain subsequent academics, 
degenerated into simple assertions that detriment to the promisee is the 
actual core of consideration, and that—by intellectual salto—the presence 
of unilateral, unbargained-for detrimental reliance by a promisee is 
sufficient for the enforcement of promise.88 
The crux of Langdell’s statement is his highly restricted use of the word 
“benefit.”89 As it there appears, he is referring solely to the person to 
whom the promisee’s act or forbearance is immediately directed.90 In most 
cases, that act or forbearance will be directed back toward the promisor. 
But it may be directed, as Langdell quite correctly observes, at the specific 
request of the promisor, to a third party.91 For example, a person might 
contract for a service, such as medical care, or university enrollment, to 
be provided for a family member. Even though the service is directed in 
the immediate sense to a third party, and not back toward the promisor 
him or herself, the promise to pay for the service is contractually binding. 
This is a third-party beneficiary contract, in which the promisee’s 
provision of an act or forbearance directed towards a third party serves as 
consideration for promisor’s promise to pay, precisely because the 
promisor has bargained therefor. Third-party beneficiary contracts have 
clearly been enforceable under common law since the Middle Ages.92 
In a third-party beneficiary contract, the reason a promisor has 
bargained for a direct benefit to be provided by promisee to a third party 
is that the promisor will enjoy an indirect benefit therefrom. An example 
is a parent contracting with a doctor or hospital to provide medical care to 
the parent’s child. The direct benefit flows to the child. But an obvious 
indirect benefit accrues to the parent, the promisor. Langdell’s usage of 
the word “benefit” in the passage cited above would posit that there exists 
no “benefit” to the parent in such a situation. This is an inappropriately 
narrow constriction of the term. It is precisely that indirect benefit to the 
promisor which has induced the promisor to make the promise, and which 
                                                     
88. A quintessential example of extrapolation is to be seen in the work of Eric Mills Holmes, a 
dedicated exponent of promissory estoppel. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory 
Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 271–75 (1996). 
89. See LANGDELL, supra note 85, at 81–84. 
90. Id. at 81. 
91. Id. at 80, 84. 
92. See, e.g., ST. GERMAN, supra note 47, at 230–31 (stating the principle that if one party promises 
to pay another for services to be rendered to a third party, the promise is enforceable by the promisee 
even though the promisor “haue no worldely profyte by yt,” and giving examples of the principle in 
application). 
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constitutes the legal policy basis for enforcement of the contract between 
the promisor and promisee.93 
Langdell then followed up the foregoing statement with a second which 
again tends, presumably unintentionally, to lead the reader badly astray: 
“[T]he action of assumpsit, because it was founded upon the theory that 
the defendant’s obligation was created by his promise, and not by a 
consideration received.”94 
It is wholly misguided to assert, as Langdell here did, that in contractual 
assumpsit “the defendant’s obligation was created by his promise, and not 
by a consideration received.”95 The early assumpsit cases arising out of 
exchange transactions were predicated upon the defendant having 
committed some neglect, some negligence, which gave rise to the action.96 
They thus sounded properly in tort based on negligence, not in contract 
that entails strict liability even without negligence.97 
Later, both during and in the aftermath of the period when claims in 
assumpsit came to be permitted to succeed even without proof of 
negligence, English courts repeatedly articulated the requirement of 
reciprocity, of exchange, in such cases.98 This requirement of reciprocity 
came to be articulated formally as the requirement of “consideration.”99 
That is, in order for assumpsit to move beyond tort, and thus to impose 
liability in the absence of negligence, there need be consideration. 
Moreover, the period in which assumpsit was extended to apply not just 
to cover cases in which the plaintiff had already performed, but to 
bilaterally executory contracts, did not precede but instead coincided 
precisely with the period in which the term “consideration” was formally 
articulated to represent the already long extant requirement of 
                                                     
93. An example of a purely commercial third-party beneficiary contract is provided by Kmart Corp. 
v. Balfour Beatty, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 634 (D.V.I. 1998), in which a landlord employed a contractor to 
build a custom facility to satisfy landlord’s preexisting contractual obligation to a major tenant. 
94. LANGDELL, supra note 85, at 82. 
95. Id. 
96. See, e.g., The Humber Ferry Case, supra note 40; Waldon v. Mareschal (1369) YB 43 Edw. 3, 
fol. 33, Mich., pl. 38, collated with LI MS. Hale 187, fol. 104v, translated in SOURCES, supra note 
17, at 359. 
97. For further discussion of this point, see Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 31–32. 
98. See Shipton v. Dogge (1442), first action at CP 40/725, m. 49d, Pasch (under name “Shepton” 
rather than “Shipton”), second action record at KB 27/717, m. 111, second action report at YB 20 
Hen. 6, fol. 34, Trin., pl. 4 (KB), translated in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 390, and second action 
report translated in 51 SELDEN SOCIETY 97 (1933) [hereinafter Doige’s Case]. For more detailed 
discussion, see Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 32–35. 
99. See Isack v. Barbour (1563) KB 27/1207, m. 55, discussed in BAKER, supra note 17, at 340; 
Stone v. Withipole (1589) 74 Eng. Rep. 106, report in YLS MS. G. R29.6, fol. 81 (QB) (Eng.), 
alternate report in 1 Leon. 113, pl. 156, reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 498–99; Alden, 
Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 46–48. 
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reciprocity.100 Both occurred during the very same period in the latter half 
of the 1500s.101 
It is thus highly misleading—even if unintentionally so—to state that 
in contractual, as distinct from tortious, assumpsit, “the defendant’s 
obligation was created by his promise, and not by a consideration 
received.”102 An incorrect implication can quite readily be drawn from this 
statement that promise alone can give rise to contractual liability in the 
absence of consideration. Nothing could be further from the actual 
historical record. 
Whatever Langdell’s intent may in fact have been, these statements in 
his treatise, and their propagation to future generations of law students, 
helped set the intellectual stage for the reliance revolution to come. 
2. Ames’s Search for the Origins of Consideration in Deceit 
Next to serve as dean of Harvard Law School was James Barr Ames, 
holding that position from 1895 to 1910.103 Ames had deep knowledge of 
English legal history, and his series of lectures on the subject, focusing 
particularly on contract law, constitutes a frequent point of reference for 
those interested in the field.104 
                                                     
100. As to the extension of assumpsit to bilaterally executory contracts, see Lucy v. Walwyn (1561), 
record at KB 27/1198, m. 183, report at Gell’s reports, MS. at Hopton Hall, ff. 154v, 158v, reprinted 
in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 485; and Strangborough v. Warner (1589) 74 Eng. Rep. 686; 4 Leon. 
3 (KB). As to articulation of the reciprocity requirement under the formal name of “consideration,” 
see Isack v. Barbour (1563) and Stone v. Withipole (1589), supra note 99. 
101. Indeed, both developments occurred during the roughly thirty-year period from 1560 to 1590. 
In this regard, see the cases cited supra note 96. 
102. LANGDELL, supra note 85, at 82. This is distinct from a situation in which the promisor, at the 
very moment of making a promise, already knows that he or she will never perform thereon. This 
deliberate, conscious mendacity is actionable in tort as fraud, specifically “promissory fraud.” See 
Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 673–74. 
103. See JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 
6, 7 (1913). By virtue of the depth of his academic knowledge, he enjoyed the distinction of becoming 
the first Harvard professor appointed directly to a teaching position without having first worked in 
practice. Ames’s induction to a teaching post without prior significant practice experience initiated a 
new pattern of academic hiring which has over the course of the past century revolutionized the nature 
and focus of legal academia. Id. at 5, 8. 
104. Id. at v–vi. Many of the lectures were published in the Harvard Law Review or The Green 
Bag. However, some caution with this source must be advised as portions thereof were subsequently 
reconstituted for publication from Ames’s own lecture notes as well as contemporaneous notes taken 
by students in his class, prominent among them Samuel Williston of later promissory estoppel fame. 
Id. at v. Whether Williston’s incipient personal views on the subject might, completely in good faith, 
potentially have affected his perception and recordation of Ames’s presentations must remain purely 
speculative.  
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Of seminal importance for the intellectual history recounted in this 
Article is Ames’s inquiry at the turn of the last century into the medieval 
origins of the doctrine of consideration: 
The mystery of consideration has possessed a peculiar fascination 
for writers upon the English Law of Contract. No fewer than three 
distinct theories of its origin have been put forward within the last 
eight years. According to one view, “the requirement of 
consideration in all parol contracts is simply a modified 
generalization of quid pro quo to raise a debt by parol.” [citing 
for this proposition Oliver Wendell Holmes] On the other hand, 
consideration is described as “a modification of the Roman 
principle of causa, adopted by equity, and transferred thence into 
the common law.” [citing herefor Sir John William Salmond] A 
third learned writer derives the action of assumpsit from the 
action on the case for deceit, the damage to the plaintiff in that 
action being the forerunner of the “detriment to the promisee,” 
which constitutes the consideration of all parol contracts. [citing 
herefor John Innes Clark Hare] 
To the present writer, it seems impossible to refer consideration 
to a single source. At the present day it is doubtless just and 
expedient to resolve every consideration into a detriment to the 
promisee incurred at the request of the promisor. But this 
definition would not have covered the cases of the sixteenth 
century. There were then two distinct forms of consideration: 
(1) detriment; (2) a precedent debt . . . . The history of detriment 
is bound up with the history of special assumpsit, whereas the 
consideration based upon a precedent debt must be studied in the 
development of indebitatus assumpsit.105 
Pursuing a similar line of inquiry as the third cited approach, which he 
had attributed to Hare, Ames then went on to attempt to trace the origin 
of detriment constituting consideration to early cases in the medieval 
period involving claims of “deceit”—generally, cases susceptible to being 
characterized as involving tortious fraud in the inducement, the 
performance, or both.106 Ames characterized the cases that he focused on 
                                                     
105. Id. at 129–30 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Early English Equity, 1 L.Q. REV. 162, 171 
(1885)); see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 285 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
1881); Sir John William Salmond, The History of Contract, 3. L.Q. REV. 166, 178 (1887); JOHN INNES 
CLARK HARE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS chs. VII, VIII (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1887). 
106. See AMES, supra note 103, at 129–30, 139–47. Ames cited Hare as the original progenitor of 
this view. Id. at 145. Ames contrasted the Hare/Ames deceit theory with the opposing view of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who saw the origin of the doctrine of consideration in the requirement of quid pro 
quo in debt upon contract cases, and the view of Salmond, who posited that consideration constituted 
“a modification of the Roman principle of causa, adopted by equity, and transferred thence into the 
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as ones in which the defendant had “intentionally misled” the other 
party.107 
The significance of Ames’s exegesis is twofold. First, he followed and 
reiterated the approach taken by his mentor and decanal predecessor 
Langdell, namely to reduce consideration to a description solely in terms 
of detriment to promisee, without discussion of benefit to promisor.108 
This helped to solidify a perspective focusing on only one aspect, and the 
less important aspect, of the moral and economic basis for the legal 
enforceability of contract. 
Second, and more importantly, Ames’s search for consideration in 
deceit cases produced a number of passages which lent themselves to later 
misleading partial citation and mischaracterization by Williston to 
construct a justification for the novel doctrine of promissory estoppel.109 
The manner in which Williston misused Ames’s text for polemical 
purpose will be explored infra in connection with the drafting and 
promulgation of promissory estoppel in the 1920s.110 
Suffice it to say, for current purposes, that Ames’s thesis that the 
origins of the doctrine of consideration might be traced to deceit cases has 
been countered by John H. Baker of Cambridge University, the leading 
living historian of English legal development: 
[W]e must face the near impossibility of linking either the 
delictual history or the substantive principle with the “doctrine” 
of consideration in the way suggested by Hare and Ames. The 
elements of deceit and consequential loss were never incorporated 
in the consideration clause, but were destined to wither away as 
fictions. And in the cases that established “detriment to the 
promise” as good consideration, the consideration in question had 
nothing in common with the earlier deceit cases: it was a 
reciprocal future act, or a promise to act, by the plaintiff.111 
Fundamentally, and without disrespect to the depth of Ames’s learning 
or intellect, his discussion of the early deceit cases does not recognize the 
true role they played in the medieval evolution of contract law. As 
discussed in section I.B, in broader historical context the significance of 
the deceit cases is that they opened a creative pathway for litigants to 
                                                     
common law.” Id. at 129. For an extended discussion of Ames’s analysis in this regard, see Alden, 
Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 10–12, 54–62. 
107. AMES, supra note 103, at 127. 
108. See supra section II.A.1. 
109. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 10–12, 54–62. 
110. See infra section II.C. 
111. Baker, Origins of Consideration, supra note 73, at 357. 
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invoke the plaintiff-friendly procedural mechanisms of the tort writ of 
trespass on the case to circumvent the defense of wager of law otherwise 
available to defendants in debt upon contract cases. While a number of 
early deceit cases involved true fraud, over time the mere conclusory 
allegation of deceit was used as a pretext for bringing a claim of trespass 
on the case sounding in assumpsit. 
Rather than having its origin in deceit, the Author contends that the 
doctrine of consideration has its origin in the requirement of reciprocity 
that was recognized early in medieval English law.112 The need for 
reciprocity had been articulated by jurists well before the word 
“consideration” came to be used to describe the concept, and this 
requirement was neatly summed up in statements that a mere promise in 
the absence of reciprocal obligation was “nudum pactum” and therefore 
not enforceable.113 
Whatever narrow technical criticism might be lodged against Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s assertion that consideration “is simply a modified 
generalization of the requirements of quid pro quo to raise a debt by 
parol,”114 the overall doctrinal orientation of his view thus does not lie far 
off the mark. The requirement of quid pro quo in debt upon contract does 
no more than express the concept of reciprocity in that context. As the tort 
writ of trespass on the case sounding in assumpsit came to be 
instrumentalized for purely procedural purpose to circumvent the defense 
of wager of law, the underlying principle of reciprocity as the foundation 
of enforceability of informal contract came likewise to be asserted in those 
assumpsit cases as the requirement of consideration.115 
Importantly, though Ames sought to identify the origin of the doctrine 
of consideration in deceit cases, at no point did he renounce the principle 
that detriment to the promisee can only constitute the consideration 
necessary to justify enforcement of a promise if the detriment has been 
incurred at the request of the promisor.116 That is, there must be a 
                                                     
112. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 33–35, 46–48, 50–52. 
113. Id. at 35–36, 40–44. The parallel in this regard to earlier Roman contract law regarding pacta 
(pacts), as described in the late Roman Digest of Justinian, and the possible transmission of this 
principle to the Anglo-Norman court and judiciary via Bracton and others, have been separately 
described in detail by the Author in earlier research. Id. at 36–40. 
For contrary assertions as to the possible transmission of Roman legal principle in this regard, see 
Baker, Origins of Consideration, supra note 73, at 351–52, discussing St. German and Plowden 
writing in the 1500s. The Author’s own research has instead looked to significantly earlier potential 
absorption by the Anglo-Normans of the principal of reciprocity from Roman law, during the 1100s 
and 1200s. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 35–42. 
114. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Early English Equity, supra note 105, at 171 (emphasis omitted); see 
Baker, Origins of Consideration, supra note 73, at 354–55 (discussing Holmes’s view). 
115. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 48, 50–51. 
116. See AMES, supra note 103, at 129, 143, 147. 
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bargained-for, mutual exchange for contract to exist. This fundamental 
verity was not merely ignored but indeed affirmatively obfuscated by 
Williston in the 1920s, as will be discussed next. 
B. The Birth of “Promissory Estoppel” 
This historical account now arrives at its decisive moment: the birth of 
“promissory estoppel.” 
Early in the twentieth century, the American bar embarked upon a 
project to summarize the vast array of case law decisions constituting the 
American common law of contract into a collection of concise doctrinal 
statements of generally accepted rules applied by the courts. The 
American Law Institute (ALI) was formed in 1923 for the purpose of 
drafting and promulgating such “restatements” of major areas of the 
common law.117 Samuel Williston was chosen as official Reporter to lead 
the effort during the mid-1920s to draft and promulgate the ALI’s 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, commonly known as the “First 
Restatement.”118 
This restatement represented an enterprising and arguably laudatory 
effort by the American bar of that day to bring order and predictability to 
substantive legal rules developed through the myriad court decisions of 
common law precedent. However, though Williston’s formally stated aim 
for the project was merely to “restate the law as it is, not as a new law,”119 
in his hands the First Restatement innovated in key respect—it introduced 
onto the stage the hitherto unknown legal doctrine of “promissory 
estoppel,” set forth in Section 90 thereof.120 As originally drafted by 
Williston, this section read: “A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and 
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.”121 
                                                     
117. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the 
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 
pt. I, at 6, 13, 40 (1923). 
118. An Account of the Proceedings at the Organization of the Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. pt. II, at 4–
5 (1923). 
119. Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 159. 
120. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1932); see also supra note 5 
and accompanying text (discussing the origination of the term “promissory estoppel”). 
121. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, published by the A.L.I in 1981, and for which 
E. Allan Farnsworth served as successor Reporter, modified the wording of Section 90 in certain 
regards but did not dilute in any respect its essential claim to impose liability without either 
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1. Discontinuous Break with History 
The central doctrinal assertion of the newfound doctrine of promissory 
estoppel—namely, that a naked promise can be enforced as contract 
despite the absence of any consideration therefor—was diametrically at 
odds with the universally understood requirement of Anglo-American law 
that a promise only becomes enforceable if the promisee has paid or done 
something at promisor’s request.122 Promissory estoppel radically denied 
the essential principle of reciprocity that had been firmly established for 
centuries as the foundation of liability in Anglo-American contract. 
The First Restatement thus presented as actual, established law, 
presumptively predicated on the pedigree of centuries of organic case law 
development, a novel doctrine enjoying no such historical foundation or 
legitimacy. It thrust a parvenu, an invention, into the alleged corpus of 
existing American contract law which was, as the very title of First 
Restatement proclaims, merely being “restated,” not fabricated whole 
cloth. 
Such statements may initially strike the reader as shocking, particularly 
where one has been raised through the American law school system in 
which promissory estoppel is taught in contemporary first year contracts 
class without comment or objection as received, sacrosanct writ. Yet 
nothing could be further from the truth. 
How did such a momentous occurrence come to pass? Particularly 
where no less than Samuel Williston, widely hailed at the time as the 
nation’s leading contract law scholar at Harvard Law School, served as 
official Reporter and personally drafted the text of Section 90 embodying 
the novel doctrine?123 And where no less than Arthur Corbin of Yale Law 
School served as Williston’s right hand, strongly advocating the cause of 
promissory estoppel?124 These two men, both tremendously intelligent 
                                                     
consideration or mutual assent. For the Restatement (Second) formulation of the section, see supra 
text accompanying note 8. 
122. “Done” is here used to include both affirmative action as well as abstaining to take action, in 
either case at promisor’s request. 
123. Williston’s high stature in the legal academic community and the warm regard in which he 
was held by colleagues and students is attested to in, for example, Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: 
Samuel Williston, 49 ABA J. 362 (1963) and Austin W. Scott, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
1330 (1963). It is therefore with genuine regret, but under obligation to the subject matter and 
historical record, that the Author has written in the critical vein herein set forth. 
124. The significant and possibly leading role of Corbin in pressing the novel doctrine has been 
suggestively described by fellow Yale Professor Grant Gilmore based on conversations between the 
two men many years after the First Restatement drafting project. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 62 
n.135, 63. It appears clear, however, that it was Williston himself who personally drafted the text of 
proposed Section 90. See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in 
Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 962 n.55 (1997). 
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and learned, represented the academic establishment of their day. Yet the 
innovation of promissory estoppel, introduced by the First Restatement, 
deviated radically from established contract law doctrine. 
2. Williston’s 1920 Treatise: Crack in the Dam 
The irony is immense. In 1920, Williston had himself brought out an 
enormous treatise on Anglo-American contract law125 in which he had 
very clearly stated the requirement of consideration for the enforceability 
of contract.126 He was generally regarded as a bastion of the rules-oriented 
establishment not a revolutionary.127 
Yet a crack in the dam of Williston’s doctrinal thought was, upon closer 
inspection, already visible. In his treatise, Williston included a section 
entitled “Estoppel as a substitute for consideration.”128 Therein he cited an 
array of cases that he claimed constituted precedent for the creation of 
contract without consideration: 
It is generally true that one who has led another to act in 
reasonable reliance on his representations of fact cannot 
afterwards in litigation between the two deny the truth of the 
representations, and some courts have sought to apply this 
principle to the formation of contracts, where, relying on a 
gratuitous promise, the promisee has suffered detriment.129 
                                                     
Moreover, it was Williston who wrote the commentaries intended to provide doctrinal and historical 
justification for the novel doctrine, and he who orally advocated therefor in debate with his ALI 
colleagues. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, AM. LAW INST., COMMENTARIES ON CONTRACTS: 
RESTATEMENT NO. 2, at 14 (1926) [hereinafter WILLISTON, FIRST RESTATEMENT COMMENTARIES]; 
Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Contracts Restatement No. 2, Proceedings at the Fourth Annual 
Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. APP. 90 (1926) [hereinafter ALI Debate on Section 90]. 
125. 1–4 WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5. 
126. See 1 WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, §§ 12, 99, at 10, 191. Williston’s references there 
are to what he termed “simple contracts,” i.e., contracts other than formal contracts. Id. 
127. See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 
(2005). 
128. 1 WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, § 139, at 307–14. 
129. Id. § 139, at 307 (emphasis added). A situation where “one who has led another to act in 
reasonable reliance on his representations of fact cannot afterwards in litigation between the two deny 
the truth of the representations,” is a long-standing legal doctrine known as “equitable estoppel.” Id. 
It only applies to representations of past or existing fact, not to forward-looking statements of 
prediction or intent. See Union Mut. Life Ins. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 547 (1877). Equitable estoppel 
is therefore inapplicable to promises. Id. The quoted passage from Williston’s treatise asserts that 
some courts had nonetheless applied equitable estoppel to forward-looking promise, thus creating in 
effect an enforceable contract, in derogation of the universally understood rules regarding the 
limitation of equitable estoppel to statements of past or existing fact.  
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In his treatise, Williston then coined the entirely novel term 
“promissory estoppel” to cover this supposed vein of case law.130 
His assertion in this regard will be held up to closer inspection 
momentarily. It is of vital importance, however, to note Williston’s telling 
admission in this connection that he was consciously toying with doctrinal 
heresy. As to the proposition that one might enforce a promise upon which 
another has reasonably relied, even though the promisor in no way 
requested such reliance, he wrote, “is by no means without intrinsic merit, 
but it should be recognized that if generally applied it would much extend 
liability on promises, and that at present it is opposed to the great weight 
of authority.”131 Indeed, a more accurate statement would have been that 
such a proposition was opposed to the overwhelming, effectively 
universal weight of authority. 
Nor was this the only deviation from an orthodox understanding of 
contract law to appear in Williston’s work. As will be discussed infra in 
section II.E, in multiple other respects as well Williston’s 1920 treatise 
opted for doctrinal statements and descriptions whose tendency was to 
steer the field from the comfort of well-traveled terra firma toward alien 
terra incognita. 
3. Williston Proposes Section 90 
For reasons now unknown to historical memory, several short years 
after publication of his treatise Williston embraced the heresy of 
promissory estoppel wholeheartedly. Perhaps it was a natural evolution of 
his own intellectual tropism toward enforcement without consideration. 
Perhaps also he was encouraged to take the leap by his second, Corbin.132 
                                                     
130. See 1 WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, § 139, at 308. 
131. Id. § 139, at 313 (emphasis added). 
132. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 62–64 (discussing a conversation Gilmore and Corbin had a 
number of years earlier). As described by Gilmore, in that discussion, Corbin presented himself as 
the true progenitor and motive force behind the creation of promissory estoppel during the A.L.I. 
drafting process. Id. at 62–63. The precise roles of Williston and Corbin in the genesis of the idea 
cannot at this late date be determined with absolute certainty. Williston, however, wrote the actual 
text of Section 90 personally, wrote the written academic case in favor thereof, and led the oral 
defense of the novel doctrine in open debate within the A.L.I. as recorded in the minutes thereof. See 
Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 679–80. This Article focuses on the written 
evidentiary record left by Williston. 
04 - Alden.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:25 PM 
1638 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1609 
 
The ultimate motivation behind Williston’s change of mind must remain 
speculation. But the fact of that change is indisputable, as will be seen. 
The rubber hit the road in 1926, when Williston, in written 
commentaries133 and open debate with his ALI colleagues,134 set forth his 
justification for proposing that a doctrine of promissory estoppel be 
created and included in the First Restatement. Williston personally drafted 
text expressing his concept and labeled it in a manner that revealed its 
essential character: “Informal Contracts Without Assent or 
Consideration.”135 Numbered Section 90 of the First Restatement, it reads 
as follows: “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the 
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.”136 
C. The Asserted Justification 
Williston claimed two alleged precedential bases for adoption of this 
revolutionary principle. First, he asserted that the origins of contract law 
in the Middle Ages lay in simple reliance on a promise, rather than 
exchange.137 Second, he drew on the line of argumentation laid out in his 
treatise published six years earlier, where, as discussed supra, he had 
suggested that various much more recent cases had chosen to enforce 
promises without consideration therefor.138 Both claims are misleading. 
1. Assumpsit in the Middle Ages 
As to his claim that the origins of Anglo-American contract law in the 
Middle Ages lay in simple reliance on a promise rather than reciprocal 
exchange, Williston selectively mined certain statements from the lectures 
and writings of his mentor and predecessor Ames. 
To recall the prior discussion, Ames did not deny, and in fact affirmed, 
that detrimental reliance by a promisee constituted consideration if it was 
in fact requested by the promisor—thus creating the reciprocal exchange 
of promised performance on the one side coupled with requested 
                                                     
133. WILLISTON, FIRST RESTATEMENT COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 14. 
134. ALI Debate on Section 90, supra note 124, at 90. 
135. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ch. 3, topic 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). As to 
Williston himself having personally drafted the text, see DeLong, supra note 124, at 962 n.55. 
136. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
137. See infra section II.C.1. 
138. See infra section II.C.2. 
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detrimental action or forbearance on the other.139 Ames did, however, 
search for the origins of the consideration concept in deceit cases.140 To 
reprise, Ames hypothesized, as had Hare, that deceit gave rise to damage 
to the promisee, which he believed gave rise to the concept of detriment 
to the promisee, which can constitute consideration.141 
Yet, as Baker has pointed out, this was not in fact the genesis of the 
detriment concept constituting consideration.142 Detriment was 
recognized in cases where it was requested by the promisor and where 
there was thus a reciprocal exchange.143 As the case law evolved, the 
allegation of deceit was made simply for the purpose of moving the case 
out of the contract categories of debt and covenant, where plaintiffs faced 
significant hurdles, into the procedurally more favorable category of tort, 
in which the writ of trespass on the case sounding in assumpsit 
circumvented those hurdles.144 The allegation of deceit was a mere 
expedient. The heart of the matter was reciprocal exchange, upon which 
the courts came to insist explicitly—under the name “consideration”—
immediately following the expansion of assumpsit to apply to all debt 
upon contract cases, that is, to the great majority of day-to-day 
commercial contracts.145 
Ames’s search for the genesis of consideration in deceit cases, 
however, combined with his Langdellian focus on detriment to the 
promisee rather than benefit to the promisor, led him to pen certain 
statements that later lent themselves to partial and misleading citation by 
Williston. In fact, Williston’s commentaries that formed the foundation of 
his argument in favor of promissory estoppel based his claim as to the 
medieval treatment of contract entirely on three brief quotes from Ames, 
taken out of context in a manner that leaves the impression that naked, 
unbargained-for reliance by a promisee was historically sufficient to 
enforce promise in contract. Specifically, Williston wrote: 
The action of Assumpsit was originally based on reliance by the 
plaintiff on a promise rather than on a bargain. It was not until the 
old action of Debt was swallowed and extended by the action of 
assumpsit that the idea of exchanging consideration as the price 
of a promise became the predominant one. Professor Ames in his 
                                                     
139. See supra text accompanying note 116; AMES, supra note 103, at 143. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 106–111; AMES, supra note 103, at 129. 
141. See supra text accompanying note 106; AMES, supra note 103, at 129. 
142. See supra text accompanying note 111; Baker, Origins of Consideration, supra note 73, at 357. 
143. See supra note 142. 
144. See supra section I.B. 
145. See id.; Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 46–48. 
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History of Assumpsit (Lectures on Legal History, page 142), 
summing a preceding argument, says: 
“The gist of the action being the deceit in breaking a promise 
on the faith of which the plaintiff had been induced to part 
with his money or other property” etc. 
Mr. Ames further says (page 143): 
“That equity gave relief, before 1500, to a plaintiff who had 
incurred detriment on the faith of the defendant’s promise, is 
reasonably clear, although there are but three reported cases.” 
and (page 144): 
“Both in equity and at law, therefore, a remediable breach of 
a parol promise was originally conceived of as a deceit; that 
is, a tort. Assumpsit was in several instances distinguished 
from contract.”146 
Comprehensive refutation of Williston’s use of these quotations has 
been separately published by the Author.147 The principal results of that 
research may be summarized as follows. 
Williston’s italicized claim in the preceding block quote implies that 
there existed some proto-history, some early period of assumpsit which 
sounded, effectively, in promissory estoppel rather than exchange-based 
contract.148 The history, however, does not support such a 
characterization. 
Roughly put, the evolution was as follows. During the earliest period 
relevant for this purpose, from The Humber Ferry Case in 1348 onward, 
we have assumpsit cases predicated upon negligence or fraud, and thus 
upon tort rather than contract.149 In that 1348 case, for example, a 
ferryman who had agreed to carry a mare across the Humber River 
overloaded his boat with other horses, causing the loss of the mare.150 As 
such, the cases do not support the notion that assumpsit was used as some 
early form of promissory estoppel, which very specifically purports to 
apply liability without the presence of negligence or fraud. 
In the next period, from Doige’s Case in 1442 onward, we have the 
contractual use of assumpsit—that is, its application where no negligence 
                                                     
146. WILLISTON, FIRST RESTATEMENT COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 14 (emphasis added). 
147. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 10–12, 54–62. 
148. One hears in Williston’s claim an intellectual echo of Langdell’s earlier statements criticized 
in section II.A.1 that “benefit to the promisor is irrelevant,” and that, in the early days of contract, 
“defendant’s obligation was created by his promise, and not by a consideration received.” LANGDELL, 
supra note 85, at 82; see supra text accompanying notes 83, 88. 
149. See The Humber Ferry Case, supra note 40; Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, 
at 31–32. 
150. The Humber Ferry Case, supra note 40, at 358–59. 
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was present—but where courts were clearly articulating the reciprocity 
principle.151 In that case, defendant Dogge had contracted to sell two 
parcels of land to plaintiff Shepton, but breached by first conveying the 
parcels to a third party.152 In the transcript of the case, multiple judges 
reasoned that if one party could bring an action versus the counterparty 
(as Dogge could have sued Shepton had he refused to pay), then the 
counterparty must also be able to sue, as “each party to a bargain should 
be bound by an action” and every “good contract must bind both 
parties.”153 On that basis, the court allowed the plaintiff Shepton to 
proceed in an action against defendant Dogge for deceit, and rejected 
defendant’s attempt to have the case dismissed on grounds that the action 
should have been brought pursuant to a writ of covenant.154 
The third period relevant to Williston’s quote—the period when “the 
old action of Debt was swallowed and extended by the action of 
assumpsit”155—commenced in 1532 with Pykeryng v. Thurgoode156 In 
that case, seller breached his agreement to deliver malt to a London 
brewer.157 The court permitted plaintiff brewer to bring an action on the 
case even though he could have brought the action based on debt.158 This 
opened the floodgates to the use of trespass on the case sounding in 
assumpsit to circumvent the wager of law defense available to defendants 
in debt cases.159 Within several decades following Pykeryng v. Thurgoode, 
as contract plaintiffs began to flock to assumpsit, courts came to refer to 
the reciprocity principle by the moniker “consideration,” stating 
specifically that it was an absolute requirement for the contractual use of 
assumpsit.160 
                                                     
151. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 33–44; Doige’s Case, supra note 98. 
152. Doige’s Case, supra note 98, at 390. 
153. Id. at 394–95. 
154. Id. at 391, 393–95. 
155. WILLISTON, FIRST RESTATEMENT COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 14. 
156. (1532), record at KB 27/1073, m. 70, report at 94 SELDEN SOCIETY 247 (1977), and 93 
SELDEN SOCIETY 4 (1976), translated in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 411. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 411–13. 
159. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 44–48; Pykeryng v. Thurgoode (1532), 
record at KB 27/1073, m. 70, report at 94 SELDEN SOCIETY 247 (1977), and 93 SELDEN SOCIETY 4 
(1976), translated in SOURCES, supra note 17, at 411. 
160. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 48. 
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There is no room in that history for some imagined period of assumpsit 
being applied in the absence of negligence and the absence of reciprocity, 
of consideration, as promissory estoppel would have it. 
That Williston’s precedential claim for promissory estoppel is not truly 
supported by the quotes he selected from Ames’s historical writings is 
therefore not surprising. Careful reading of Ames’s full text reveals that 
the first passage quoted by Williston, supra, in fact relates not to 
unbargained-for reliance but quite the converse.161 The full passage, 
which Williston abridged with his cryptic “etc.,” and the paragraph in 
which it is embedded, describe third-party beneficiary contract on the 
basis of bargained-for exchange in which the promisor has specifically 
requested the detriment incurred by promisee.162 The passage provides no 
support for promissory estoppel. 
Likewise, the second and third passages both relate to a small handful 
of cases cited by Ames that appear to be founded upon promissory fraud—
a true tort.163 Ames was clear in his text that that particular handful of 
cases involved situations in which the defendant had “intentionally 
misled” the other party.164 Where culpable conduct in the form of 
negligence or fraud are present, a case may be brought in tort without 
having to prove the consideration necessary to liability in contract. 
Conversely, where no negligence or fraud or other tortious conduct is 
present, then an exchange founded upon mutual consideration must be 
shown in order to establish liability in contract. Tort cases sounding in the 
tort of promissory fraud do not, therefore, provide precedential support 
for Williston’s claim that assumpsit was used to impose liability without 
either contractual consideration or tortious culpability, which is the central 
assertion of the supposed doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
2. Idiosyncratic Exceptions to the Consideration Requirement 
Thus, Williston’s argument for promissory estoppel in his 
commentaries led with misleading historical claims regarding the origins 
of contract law. He augmented that effort with claims regarding 
preexisting case law exceptions to the consideration requirement.165 
                                                     
161. See id. at 54–55. 
162. Id.; AMES, supra note 103, at 142. 
163. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 55–62. 
164. AMES, supra note 103, at 127 (emphasis added). 
165. These claims were made by Williston in his commentaries and the ALI debate regarding the 
First Restatement. They also drew on cases he had previously cited and interpreted in his earlier 1920 
treatise. See WILLISTON, FIRST RESTATEMENT COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 15–19; ALI 
Debate on Section 90, supra note 124; WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, at 307–14. 
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Detailed forensic investigation thereof, however, reveals radically 
thinner support for this proposition than one might at first suppose. The 
details of this forensic investigation have been laid out by the Author in a 
prior article on the subject.166 
Broadly stated, upon close examination Williston’s support for the 
foregoing proposition reduces to: (i) a handful of discrete, narrow, 
idiosyncratic exceptions of long standing to the otherwise universal 
requirement of consideration; (ii) interpretive claims and assumptions by 
Williston which are not well founded with respect to a smattering of 
isolated recent American cases which he cited; and (iii) a single rogue 
decision regarding an intrafamily donative promise. 
a. Discrete, Limited Exceptions 
As to the idiosyncratic exceptions to the consideration requirement 
cited by Williston, they fall into a mere handful of discrete categories 
which had long existed within classical contract law: (i) waiver within an 
existing contractual relationship; (ii) charitable donation; (iii) gratuitous 
promise in connection with marriage; (iv) gratuitous promise to convey 
real estate, in reliance upon which improvements thereto have been made; 
and (v) gratuitous bailment.167 Equitable reasons for each of these narrow 
exceptions to the consideration requirement may be adduced and have 
been discussed at length in prior published research by the Author.168 The 
principal salient point is that each of these categories had over time been 
carved out as a narrow, limited exception to the consideration 
requirement, without metastasizing into rejection of the principle of 
reciprocity more generally. They are, as it were, doctrinal cysts, or benign 
tumors, within the body of contract law—not cancer. Contained, limited, 
and best left so.169 
b. Isolated Cases 
Williston sought to augment those discrete, limited exceptions to the 
consideration requirement with his interpretation of a handful of 
American cases from the 1800s and early 1900s.170 Those interpretive 
                                                     
166. See Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 683–704. 
167. See WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, at 307–14. 
168. See Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 685–92. 
169. See infra section II.C.5 regarding Williston’s contrary view on this point. 
170. See Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F.2d 138 (E.D. Pa. 1925); Wilson v. Spry, 223 S.W. 564 
(Ark. 1920); Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888); Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & Rawle 267 (Pa. 
1826). 
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claims, however, generally overreached or overstated.171 In a number of 
instances, Williston either misread the holding of cases,172 or made factual 
assumptions at odds with those actually recited by the courts as the 
foundation for their reasoning.173 Thus, while Williston’s treatise gives 
the impression that a number of cases created solid precedent for the 
concept of promissory estoppel, they do not hold up upon closer 
inspection. 
c. Intrafamily Donative Promises 
This leaves us with the rogue decision based on an intrafamily donative 
transfer, Ricketts v. Scothorn.174 Out of all the cases cited by Williston, 
Ricketts truly is the one opinion which clearly and unambiguously stands 
for the proposition he articulated as promissory estoppel, though that 
neologism was later coined by Williston and did not appear in Ricketts 
itself.175 The case is now famous as the shining exemplar of promissory 
estoppel routinely taught in first year contract classes across the nation. 
The case involved a grandfather who promised to give his 
granddaughter $2,000 so that she would not have to work anymore.176 In 
evidence thereof, he handed her a promissory note in such amount.177 The 
court went to great pains to stress that the grandfather made his promise 
without demanding any quid pro quo, any reciprocal exchange.178 It was 
thus, as presented by the court, an entirely gratuitous promise to pay 
$2,000, for which there was no consideration.179 The grandfather passed 
away before the note was paid out.180 Litigation arose when the 
granddaughter sought payment on the note, which effort was resisted by 
another member of the Ricketts family serving as executor of the estate.181 
Despite the absence of consideration for the note, the court enforced it on 
                                                     
171. See Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 692–96. 
172. See id. at 693, 695–96; Bassick Mfg. Co., 9 F.2d 138; Wilson, 223 S.W. 564. 
173. See Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 693–95; Devecmon, 14 A. 464. 
174. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). 
175. There was one other case, again dealing with an intrafamily donative transfer, cited by 
Williston that contained language along lines substantially similar to Ricketts. See Estate of Switzer 
v. Gertenbach, 122 Ill. App. 26, 28–29 (1905). In Switzer, however, the court indicated that “[i]t is 
not our purpose to enter into a discussion of the evidence,” instead remanding the case as to 
applicability of the statute of limitations. Id. at 29–31. 
176. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 365–66. 
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the basis of “equitable estoppel,” applied to preclude the estate from 
denying the existence of consideration as a defense.182 
Presumably, other relatives of the grandfather, rather than the 
granddaughter, would ordinarily have been entitled to the proceeds of the 
estate at issue. Had the grandfather wanted to give $2,000 to his 
granddaughter, he could of course have given her the cash promptly. The 
case, however, suggests that this might not have been an attractive or even 
practicable option, insofar as the grandfather apparently would have 
needed to sell his farm in Ohio to do so.183 Alternatively, he could have 
included her in a will, which he appears not to have done. Instead, he 
promised to give her the money in the future—a promise to make a gift.184 
Under existing legal rules of long standing, the granddaughter was not 
entitled to compel payment of the promised gift out of the estate.185 For 
good and compelling reason—circumstances may change, a prospective 
donor’s state of emotion or intention may change—the general rule is that 
a gift, including a gift of cash, is effective upon delivery and at no time 
before.186 Handing over a promissory note does not constitute delivery of 
cash, but rather delivery of a promise to hand over cash in the future.187 
At the time of the Ricketts decision, as the court itself freely conceded, the 
established rule was that a gratuitous promissory note constituted no more 
than a promise to make payment in the future, in exchange for no 
consideration at all.188 Such a promissory note would be a naked promise, 
wholly gratuitous, and unenforceable at law.189 
But the court clearly desired to reach a decision in the granddaughter’s 
favor, against the interest of those other relatives of the grandfather who 
would otherwise have been entitled to the proceeds of the estate. The 
moral force of those competing claims by other relatives was not touched 
upon by the court. Certainly, the facts as presented by the court pull at any 
normal person’s heartstrings, though it is notoriously easy for a court to 
present the facts of a case in such manner as to lay an apparently 
unimpeachable moral foundation for the motivated conclusion in the 
opinion. At any rate, in driving toward its objective the court found itself 
hard up against two universally acknowledged rules of hoary precedent: 
                                                     
182. Id. at 367. 
183. Id. at 366. 
184. Id. 
185. See discussion supra section II.C.4. 
186. See generally Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses 
in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341 (1926). 
187. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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(i) a gratuitous promissory note is not enforceable, for it constitutes no 
more than a gratuitous promise to make a gift in the future190; and 
(ii) equitable estoppel applies only to statements of past or existing fact, 
or to statements of intention to abandon an existing right, but does not 
otherwise apply to promises or other forward-looking statements.191 
Confronted with two rock solid rules that would bar a decision in favor 
of the granddaughter, the court did what courts on occasion do in such 
situations—it obfuscated, it ignored. As to the gratuitous note, the court 
reached out to wholly inapplicable precedent for assistance, namely 
charitable donation cases.192 Presumably founded upon public policy 
considerations in favor of eleemosynary activity, courts have long favored 
promises to make charitable donations in the future and, as mentioned 
supra, had crafted an exception to the ordinarily applicable requirement 
of consideration for the enforceability thereof.193 Although nothing in the 
Ricketts fact pattern had anything to do with charitable donations—it was, 
after all, the promise of a private gift to a personal family member—the 
court simply cross-applied charitable donation precedents to a 
noncharitable case as alleged justification for its decision.194 
Even more blatantly, the court did not mention the universally 
understood limitation that equitable estoppel applies only to statements of 
existing fact and not to forward-looking promises.195 Perhaps the court 
deliberately turned a blind eye. Perhaps the court was simply unaware of 
the established contours of equitable estoppel. Either way, the rule was 
ignored. Against all precedent, and without any explanation of any kind, 
the court applied equitable estoppel to enforce a promise to make a gift in 
the future.196 
What one is left with, at the end of the day, is a rogue case. One might 
or might not be amenable to the motivated result. Certainly, one wishes 
the granddaughter to win at an emotional level based on the facts recited 
                                                     
190. Id. 
191. See, e.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1877) (finding that oral 
promise by life insurance company agent that the company would give advance notice to insured of 
premium due dates did not give rise to estoppel claim, since it related to future intention with respect 
to a contract not yet made, rather than to a statement of fact or intended abandonment of an existing 
right). 
192. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366–67. 
193. See supra section II.C.2.a. 
194. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366–67. 
195. See Union Mut. Life Ins., 96 U.S. at 547. The exception to this rule is estoppel arising from 
the promise of an intended waiver of an already existing right, as distinct from the creation of a new 
obligation. See id. 
196. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 367. The court’s 1898 ruling referred only to “equitable estoppel,” as the 
phrase “promissory estoppel” had yet to be invented by Williston in his 1920 treatise. See supra 
section II.B. 
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by the court—her wholly understandable tears of joy and gratitude upon 
receipt of the note, the absolute clarity of the grandfather’s promise, and 
her reliance on that promise in temporarily—though not permanently—
resigning her employ. And perhaps the result is therefore morally 
justifiable. But the court should have set forth the legal quandary in an 
honest manner, forthrightly acknowledging the existence of clear, 
unambiguous rules to the contrary. If the court wished to differ from those 
rules, it should have wrestled openly with the equitable and practical 
considerations figuring into such a deviation from doctrine. The ultimate 
result should have presented as the unicorn, as the outlier, that it was. 
Instead, the court simply ignored or misapplied longstanding, controlling 
precedent on point. 
3. Williston’s Unbounded Extrapolation 
Largely upon the basis of Ricketts, and upon wide-sweeping 
extrapolation by Williston, we now have promissory estoppel. This 
statement may initially seem exaggerated, but on closer examination the 
evidence bears it out. 
In the ALI’s internal debate, Williston justified his proposed doctrine 
of promissory estoppel on his stated anticipation that untold numbers of 
exceptions to the consideration requirement would arise in the future, 
other than those limited, narrow niche exceptions—including intrafamily 
donative promises à la Ricketts—discussed supra: 
You can enumerate all the classes of cases which I have 
enumerated and have a number of special instances, and then 
another instance will come up and it will not be covered by the 
Restatement. If the law is to be simplified, it seems to me it must 
be done by coordinating the classes of cases rather than by 
enumerating a lot of special instances.197 
As a result, wrote Williston, the nearly unbounded liability principle of 
promissory estoppel “cannot be made more definite. The variety of 
circumstances that may arise is such that it is impossible to enumerate 
them all.”198 
During the internal ALI debate over the advisability of Williston’s 
proposed promissory estoppel Section 90, he was strongly challenged by 
Victor Morawetz. Morawetz made the point that cases one might decide 
on the basis of Williston’s proposed doctrine of promissory estoppel could 
often be resolved much more conservatively, in a manner consistent with 
                                                     
197. ALI Debate on Section 90, supra note 124, at 107 (remarks of Samuel Williston). 
198. Id. at 100. 
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existing rules of contract law. Specifically, where one party has made a 
promise for the purpose of inducing another to rely on that promise, it is 
child’s play to enforce that promise on the basis of implied unilateral 
contract.199 Anglo-American courts had been enforcing implied 
contracts—where the quid pro quo is not explicitly stated by the parties 
but is reasonably implicit based on the presence of an exchange 
transaction in fact—ever since the early 1600s.200 No recourse to 
anomalous new theories of liability was requisite. 
Williston’s reply—his sole reply—to this compelling objection was 
that he wished to create liability for gift promises, thus overturning the 
longstanding existing rule declaring gift promises unenforceable.201 
Moreover, of cardinal and conclusive importance, the three brief fact 
patterns at the end of Section 90, which Williston listed in the First 
Restatement to illustrate how the principle of promissory estoppel should 
be applied, were all based on intrafamily gift cases.202 Two of those three 
need not necessarily have been promissory estoppel examples at all, 
potentially sounding in classical contract with mutual consideration 
instead.203 The third was clearly based on the Ricketts fact pattern.204 
That is, although Williston had justified promissory estoppel on 
asserted grounds that myriad new exceptions to the consideration 
requirement might arise in the future, when push came to shove under 
challenge from Morawetz, and when the First Restatement gave actual 
examples of how Section 90 was intended to apply in practice, the only 
new exception actually specified was intrafamily donative promise. 
While neither the Ricketts opinion nor Williston specifically referred to 
the language in Blackstone’s treatise regarding intrafamily gift promises 
discussed supra,205 and while Blackstone’s own intended articulation of 
the rules may be open to some degree of interpretive speculation,206 one 
may perhaps hear a whisper in the historical pines—a whisper that the 
enforceability of a promise to one’s own kin, to one’s own lineal 
descendants, might serve the promisor’s interest in a manner not captured 
by the consideration rule. This is particularly true where enforcement is 
sought not against the promisor while living, but against the promisor’s 
                                                     
199. Id. at 88 (remarks of Victor Morawetz). 
200. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 367. 
201. ALI Debate on Section 90, supra note 124, at 89 (remarks of Samuel Williston). 
202. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 1–3 (AM. LAW INST. 1932); Alden, 
Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 702–04. The fourth illustrative example is described 
therein as “not binding” and is thus not applicable here. Id. at 702 n.216. 
203. Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6, at 702–04. 
204. Id. at 703. 
205. See supra section I.E. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 60–70. 
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estate. Conceivably, there arises on a recurring basis equitable discomfort 
in the courts with declaring intrafamily donative promises not 
enforceable, established legal rules to the contrary notwithstanding. It 
may well be that situations present themselves from time to time in which 
a senior has made clear their intent with respect to disposition of their 
assets upon passing but, perhaps out of ignorance of the rules of probate, 
wills, and trusts, fails to provide therefor in a legally efficacious manner. 
One can imagine judges desiring to intercede to do equity. If so, a limited, 
discrete exception to the ordinarily applicable consideration rule for 
intrafamily gift promises might be taken under advisement—or, indeed, a 
different solution for such situations, as discussed infra.207 
D. Ramifications 
In sum, despite Williston’s unbounded speculation as to the potential 
emergence of other exceptions to the consideration requirement in future, 
promissory estoppel was in fact founded upon an exceedingly narrow 
basis—intrafamily donative promise. 
Yet the purported principle of liability set forth in his draft Section 90 
was an exception so broad as to engulf and obliterate the actual, 
historically founded rule concerning consideration. Section 90 quite 
simply asserts that promise may be enforced without any negligence, 
fraud or other tortious misconduct, and without any consideration for the 
promise.208 All that must be present under Section 90 is that the reliance 
be reasonably foreseeable (even if the promisor believes such reliance to 
be substantively unfair and unreasonable from an equitable perspective), 
and that a judge, in the judge’s quite deliberately unfettered discretion, 
deems that injustice can only be avoided through enforcement of the 
promise.209 
The logical consequence of this extraordinary claim is that there is no 
requirement of consideration—at least not if everyone were to adopt 
Williston’s invented new principle of liability. As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
had written decades before promissory estoppel was presumably even a 
gleam in Williston’s eye, “It would cut up the doctrine of consideration 
by the roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise binding by 
subsequently acting in reliance on it.”210 
We thus have a doctrinal revolution in American contract law. Though 
the narrow, limited category of intrafamily donative promise was the only 
                                                     
207. See infra section II.A.3. 
208. See generally Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, supra note 6. 
209. See id. at 671–74, 676. 
210. Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884). 
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concrete example given in illustration of its intended application, 
promissory estoppel was deliberately drafted in a manner of nearly 
unbounded scope, capable of unrestricted application and expansion in the 
future. Williston sold his radical proposal to the academy on the basis of 
two claims to historical precedent and thus legitimacy—his claim that 
early assumpsit constituted, in effect, promissory estoppel, and his claim 
that a large number of cases leading up to the First Restatement provided 
precedential support for the principle. As the foregoing analysis has 
argued, upon closer inspection both of these two weight-bearing 
columns—the foundation upon which the intellectual and doctrinal 
legitimacy of promissory estoppel depends—collapse. 
E. Collateral Innovations Throughout the First Restatement 
The introduction into American contract law of a novel principle in 
radical derogation of its two core requirements—mutual assent and 
consideration—would naturally engender severe doctrinal stress 
throughout the structure of the Restatement. At least, it would do so if the 
Restatement were otherwise to remain true to its stated mission of 
presenting existing law with fidelity. Promissory estoppel might then 
stand isolated on its own in Section 90, perhaps someday susceptible to 
cauterization in times to come—unless adjustments were undertaken to 
other aspects of contract law as well. 
Such adjustments were forthcoming. Whether by adventitious 
circumstance, or through complex causal interconnection, Williston’s 
pattern of thought as to contract law deviated from orthodoxy not just as 
to his novel doctrine of promissory estoppel, but in other regards as well. 
Those other deviations meshed conceptually with promissory estoppel in 
a manner furnishing that novel principle with an appearance of greater 
doctrinal propriety and fit with the overall structure of contract law than 
it would have enjoyed standing alone. These various deviations from 
orthodoxy had already appeared in Williston’s 1920 treatise. He now 
enshrined them as corollary innovations to contract law in multiple 
sections of the First Restatement. 
Williston did not designate these innovations as alterations to classical 
rules. Far from it. Over the repeated objection and concerns of ALI 
colleagues,211 he passed them off in anodyne fashion as mere technical or 
                                                     
211. See Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 160–64 (1925) (remarks of Victor 
Morawetz) (“If this section means that the word contract . . . means a promise or a set of promises, 
then I believe it to be incorrect as the Bench and Bar generally conceive of a contract as an agreement 
between parties creating some legal obligation on the part of one or more of them. . . . Section 3 is 
not an accurate definition of the conception which lawyers and lawmen work with or that upon which 
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theoretical rephrasings of an unadulterated age-old principle. 
Nonetheless, the subtle, corrosive effect was to shift the focus of contract 
law away from mutual exchange, historically the foundation of 
contractual liability, to unilateral, unbargained-for reliance on promise, 
the breeding ground of promissory estoppel. 
1. Elimination of Consideration in the Definition of “Contract” 
A cardinal case in point is the very definition of the term “contract” at 
the outset of the First Restatement. For centuries theretofore, from the 
epochal Slade’s Case of 1602, through Blackstone, through William 
Wetmore Story212 and his colleagues in the mid-1800s, through Langdell, 
a contract had been defined along approximately the same lines as this 
famous passage from Slade’s Case: “[A]n assumption [i.e., a contract] is 
nothing other than a mutual agreement between the parties for something 
to be performed by the defendant in consideration of some benefit which 
                                                     
the body of the law is based. It may accord with what is called the objective theory . . . but I do not 
believe in that theory . . .” (emphasis added)). 
Id. at 169–72 (remarks of Homer Albers) (“I read that definition to one of the justices of the highest 
court in one of our States, to two practicing lawyers and to six students, and only one pretended to 
know what was meant by the definition, and that was one of the students who, in my opinion, knew 
the least about it of any of them. . . . What are you going to do with the well known 
case . . .‘Peerless’?” (emphasis added)). 
Id. at 178 (remarks of Charles W. Pierson and Samuel Williston) (Pierson: “Your 
definitions . . . limit the definition of contract to an executory contract. Is not confusion likely to result 
if we do that, from the fact that contract, as used in the Constitution of the United States, means an 
executed contract as well as an executory contract? A deed is as much a contract under the impairment 
of contract clause as a promise for the future.” Williston: “Undoubtedly that is true.”). 
Id. at 180 (remarks of Helm Bruce) (“Blackstone’s definition is very familiar to the profession and 
to practicing lawyers and judges on the bench. The form of statement given here is something entirely 
new . . . . It would strike that judge as something he never heard of before.” (emphasis added)). 
Id. at 181 (remarks of Clarence N. Goodwin) (“I particularly agree with the Reporter in his 
statement that in making a Restatement you are not to change the law. . . . [T]he present [re]statement 
of the law is, in the main, unscientific, contradictory and casual. Apparently in every attempt at 
definition there has been a statement made which subsequently appeared to be inaccurate and which 
was followed not by a correct restatement but by some patch-work or the creation of legal fictions.” 
(emphasis added)). 
Id. at 185 (remarks of Merritt Lane) (“[T]his section . . . was intended, as I understood it, to 
withdraw from the definition of a contract any intent, actual intent to contract. Actual intent is 
something which the law has always conceived to be in the concept of a contract and it is something 
upon which the whole structure of equitable jurisprudence is based.”). 
212. W.W. Story was the son of well-known Justice Joseph Story of the U.S. Supreme Court. W.W. 
Story wrote a major treatise on contract law published in the mid-1800s and dedicated to his father. 
See WILLIAM WETMORE STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL 
(Boston, C. C. Little & J. Brown 1844). 
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must depart from the plaintiff, or of some labour or prejudice which must 
be sustained by the plaintiff.”213 
Williston, however, determined to rephrase the definition of contract in 
the First Restatement to read as follows: “A contract is a promise or a set 
of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”214 
Anyone who has taken a first-year contracts class in law school and 
spent time considering this definition critically, recognizes at once that it 
says very little. It is an internally self-referential circularity—the law shall 
enforce that which it chooses to enforce. This definitional implosion 
effaces from historical memory the age-old, heritage definition of 
contract, which turned on the presence of both mutual consideration and 
mutual agreement. No whisper of consideration, no whisper of agreement, 
remains. This essentially meaningless, empty vessel of a definition was, 
of course, precisely what was requisite to accommodate within its 
capacious, ill-defined parameters the doctrinal heresy of Section 90. 
It was again Morawetz who objected, citing multiple sections of the 
draft restatement, including Williston’s proposed new definition of 
“contract”: 
I believe that in his restatement of the law there are many sections 
which fail to state the law as clearly and as simply as it might be 
stated, and, above all, the restatement is based upon certain 
conceptions, certain fundamental conceptions, which are artificial 
and unusual, which are not the conceptions which lawyers and 
laymen commonly hold, and which, in my opinion, cannot be 
made the basis of a philosophic and clear and simple restatement 
of the law.215 
Williston deflected, saying of Morawetz’s criticism, “of course with 
many things he says I agree; nobody could disagree; but although I have 
had the advantage of his views before, I have persisted in section 1 [the 
definition of ‘contract’]. The word contract has had a varying meaning in 
the law.”216 
                                                     
213. Slade’s Case, supra note 45, at 429; accord 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *442; STORY, 
supra note 212, at 1; LANGDELL, supra note 85, at 58.  
214. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). This same vague, 
circular, entirely novel formulation of the definition of contract had, with somewhat different 
wording, appeared shortly before in Williston’s treatise. WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, at 1. 
215. Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 161 (remarks of Victor Morawetz). 
216. Id. at 164 (remarks of Samuel Williston).  
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2. Elimination of Executed Contracts 
Williston’s comments then illuminated the next respect in which his 
definition of contract was to differ from that which had gone before. 
Blackstone, he said, included within the term “contract” a transaction 
wholly executed on both sides, such as a current sale of goods for cash.217 
Williston chose to exclude such transactions, since time immemorial an 
enormous component of day-to-day commercial relations, from the 
definition of contract entirely: 
A sale over the counter for a price paid down is, under 
Blackstone’s definition, a contract.  
Now, under the division of law that we propose to adopt here, we 
dealt, and propose to deal, with the subject of sales as part of the 
law of property and not as part of the law of contracts, confining 
the law of contracts to executory obligations.218 
Again, the effect of Williston’s definition was to deemphasize the role 
of exchange as the foundation of contract, focusing the subject instead on 
promise. Indeed, one of the First Restatement’s explanatory comments 
literally excluded from the term “contract” the promisee’s 
counterperformance constituting consideration for a unilateral promise: 
When an act is done as the consideration for a unilateral 
contract . . . and is essential to make the promise obligatory, the 
act is not a part of the promise, and hence is not part of the contract 
as contract is here defined.219 
That is, one half of the exchange transaction—actually rendered 
performance—was to be excluded from the definition of contract, in order 
that reference only be made to the promise, and not to the exchange. 
This pattern of exclusive focus on the existence of promise, and 
obfuscation, indeed quasi-effacement, of reference to an underlying 
exchange transaction, lent itself to Section 90’s expansion of liability for 
promise to situations in which no exchange whatsoever is present. 
3. Elimination of Agreement 
Hand in hand with the foregoing went a subterranean tectonic shift that 
undermined the age-old requirement of contract law that the promisor 
                                                     
217. Id. at 165; see 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *443 (“A contract may also be either 
executed, as if A agrees to change horses with B, and they do it immediately ; [sic] in which case the 
possession and the right are transferred together : [sic] or it may be executory, as if they agree to 
change next week . . . .”). 
218. Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 165 (remarks of Samuel Williston). 
219. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
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have assented to an exchange transaction. Williston subtly signaled his 
aversion to Blackstone’s definition of contract as one in which there is 
agreement between two parties: “Blackstone defines a contract as an 
‘agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular 
thing,’ and that definition has been frequently quoted, and I suppose that 
the prevalence of the word agreement is largely due to the fact that 
Blackstone uses it.”220 In gently dismissive manner, this presentation thus 
demoted the importance of agreement, of mutually agreed exchange, at 
the heart of contract to a mere choice of words by Blackstone. 
Further undermining the importance of voluntary agreement to an 
exchange transaction, Williston also opted for a strong form of the so-
called “objective” theory of mutual assent. Historically, courts had 
routinely considered it essential to the formation of a contract that both 
parties have consciously assented thereto, that there be a “meeting of the 
minds.”221 This was the “subjective” theory of mutual assent.222 
A fairly straightforward anti-abuse rule in this regard maintains that a 
party is not at liberty to make a statement which to any other reasonable 
person would appear to be a promise, and then later simply to deny having 
subjectively intended the statement as a promise. In such a case, the 
“objective theory” of mutual assent holds the speaking party to the 
meaning any other reasonable person would ascribe to their words.223 The 
objective theory was and is nothing more than a sophisticated, adult 
articulation of the childhood playground rule, “no crossies”—in other 
words, a party shall not be permitted to escape liability by subsequently 
asserting a secret intention (physically expressed by crossing one’s fingers 
hidden behind one’s back) at odds with that party’s externally manifested 
conduct and communications. 
The most appropriate way to describe the objectivist legal principle 
would simply be to observe that, since a person’s true, internal subjective 
intent can never be known with absolute certainty absent a concession 
thereof, in certain circumstances courts and juries must of necessity infer 
subjective intent from external, objective indicia. It is not that subjective 
intent is irrelevant to contract formation, but merely a statement of the 
practical realities involved in attempting to ascertain a party’s true 
subjective intent at the time a statement was made if that party later 
attempts to deny the facially obvious import of their words or conduct. 
                                                     
220. Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 164–65 (remarks of Samuel Williston). 
221. Williston himself had conceded this in his treatise. See WILLISTON TREATISE, supra note 5, at 
3 n.7 (internal citation omitted).  
222. “The view here criticised,” wrote Williston, “was developed as part of the system of 
philosophy, law and economics, which, during the first half of the nineteenth century laid emphasis 
on the will.” Id. at 21. 
223. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, at 118–19. 
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Williston chose a sharply worded formulation of this anti-abuse rule in 
Section 20 of the First Restatement, however, which gave certain of his 
colleagues pause: 
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal 
contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which such 
assent is manifested must be done with the intent to do those acts; 
but . . . neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor 
real or apparent intent that the promises shall be legally binding 
is essential.224 
Likewise, a comment to Section 71 of the First Restatement announced 
that “[t]he mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of 
a contract.”225 
Again, the practical effect of this strong and repeatedly emphasized 
formulation of the objective test, insofar as promissory estoppel is 
concerned, was to deemphasize the promisor’s intent in making a 
statement and to focus attention nearly exclusively on how the statement 
may have been perceived by a counterparty. It was an intellectually subtle 
shift, but one that contributed to the overall sea change in favor of 
promissory estoppel. The promisor need not subjectively have intended to 
make any kind of verbal commitment to another—but if a counterparty 
might reasonably have interpreted the statement as a promise, the speaker 
is legally bound. To reprise, First Restatement promissory estoppel 
Section 90 was organized under the rubric of informal “contracts” which 
require neither consideration nor assent.226 
4. The Academy Accedes 
The totality of the innovations introduced by Williston caused no little 
agitation among his colleagues. Repeatedly, they expressed concern that 
Williston’s formulations did not accurately reflect the actual rules of 
contract law as universally understood by bench and bar.227 He assured 
                                                     
224. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). As to objection, see 
the remarks of Victor Morawetz and Merritt Lane, supra note 211. 
225. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
226. Id. ch. 3, topic 4. For further discussion of whether the counterparty must be reasonable in 
their decision detrimentally to rely on a statement by the speaker for which the counterparty has not 
paid (a supplemental requirement subsequently imposed by some courts but not in fact required by 
Section 90 itself), and whether that statement need even be sufficiently definite to constitute a true 
“promise” within the parameters of normal, classical contract law (which definiteness requirement a 
number of courts have rejected in applying Section 90), see Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 
supra note 6, at 670–71, 674–76. 
227. See Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 160–64 (remarks of Victor 
Morawetz); id. at 169–72 (remarks of Homer Albers); id. at 178 (remarks of Charles W. Pierson); id. 
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them again, as at the outset, that no mutation of principle was being 
undertaken, that the objective was merely to present the law as it was, not 
as a new law. The following exchange between Williston and Merritt Lane 
is illustrative in this regard: 
Lane: It seems to me that this restatement, so-called, is not in fact 
a restatement, but rather a new statement of what we might wish 
to be the law. To be effective it would seem that it should restate 
the law as it is and not as we might wish it to be. 
Williston: I quite agree that the law should be stated as it is.228 
Yet at the end of the day, Williston’s innovative formulations of the 
law remained in the First Restatement text as adopted and published by 
the ALI. 
In the wake of this revolutionary document, American academics 
rallied to the new banner of promissory estoppel which had been raised. 
This may have reflected the temper of the times, which during the Great 
Depression witnessed a sharp shift in American politics and thought 
entailing a host of philosophic and policy preferences conducive to 
promissory estoppel. This may have reflected the overawing status of the 
ALI and its proclamation of “the law as it is.”229 It may have reflected the 
imprimatur of the elite educational establishment imparted by Williston 
and Corbin themselves. It may have reflected the riptide of crowd 
psychology and the overwhelming instinct in many to avoid taking 
positions at odds with socially “acceptable” opinion. It may well have 
reflected a combination of some or all of these. The end result was the 
rapid and uncritical assimilation of American academia to the new, 
unprecedented paradigm. 
F. Forward Momentum 
1. Third Party Reliance in the Restatement (Second) 
The momentum of the innovatory effort carried forward to the drafting 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and publication in 1981, of a Restatement of the 
Law of Contracts, Second, commonly referred to as the “Restatement 
(Second).”230 Following Williston’s example, the Restatement (Second) 
undertook modifications to Section 90 to widen yet further the scope of 
potential liability for promise. 
                                                     
at 179–80 (remarks of Helm Bruce); id. at 180–83 (remarks of Clarence N. Goodwin); id. at 184–85 
(remarks of Merritt Lane). 
228. Id. at 185 (remarks of Samuel Williston and Merritt Lane). 
229. See Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 159 and accompanying text.  
230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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According to revised Section 90, a promisor could now face liability 
not only to the party to whom they had spoken, the promisee, but now also 
to others, to third parties, as long as it was reasonably foreseeable that 
such third parties might rely on the promise.231 The historical, precedential 
foundation for such an extraordinary assertion remains wholly 
mysterious. 
2. An Entirely New Fundamental Category of Law? 
Latter day proponents of promissory estoppel have indeed sought to 
elevate the doctrine to the status of an equitable category of law standing 
on its own, separate from both tort and contract. 
This tack has been advocated by Eric Mills Holmes, who has taken a 
strong position in favor of promissory estoppel and its further doctrinal 
extension. He sees promissory estoppel evolving from a “Contract Phase, 
in which promissory estoppel developed as a consideration substitute,” to 
a “Tort Phase, in which courts . . . applied promissory estoppel as an 
offensive doctrine (independent of contract) for awarding reliance 
damages,” to an “Equity Phase, in which courts assimilate the earlier three 
phases (estoppel, contract, and tort) and apply promissory estoppel as an 
equitable theory to rectify wrongs by awarding corrective relief based on 
the discrete facts of each case. The remedy is discretionary, with no 
mechanical bright line.”232 He refers to it as a “protean,” “syncretistic 
doctrine of civil liability, or, more simply, a theory of American civil 
liability.”233 
A few years prior to Eric Mills Holmes having written those words, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota in Cohen v. Cowles Media234 had indeed 
applied promissory estoppel in a manner clearly separate from contract.235 
In that early 1990s case, a source gave information to a newspaper only 
upon the newspaper’s promise to keep his identity confidential.236 That 
promise was not ultimately honored. The court determined that the parties 
                                                     
231. The new, revised text of Section 90 indicates that “[a] promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only be 
enforcement of the promise.” Id. § 90 (emphasis added). 
232. Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, supra note 88, at 270. 
233. Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45, 48 
(1996). The Author has in separate scholarship sharply criticized Eric Mills Holmes’s sweeping 
claims as to historical precedent for promissory estoppel. See Alden, Origins of Contract Law, supra 
note 15, at 14–15, 62–65. 
234. 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). 
235. Id. at 388. 
236. Id. at 388–89. 
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would not have contemplated legally binding contractual obligations to 
have arisen from the newspaper’s promise and that “a contract cause of 
action is inappropriate for these particular circumstances.”237 But then—
despite the fact that promissory estoppel had been conceived and created 
by Williston as a subapplication of contract law—the court concluded that 
promissory estoppel should apply to the newspaper’s promise.238 
Like a cuckoo’s egg laid in the nest of contract, such an approach would 
indeed, if widely propagated, lead the novel doctrine of promissory 
estoppel to hatch and spread its wings as an independent field of law. 
III. REVERSING THE REVOLUTION 
The issue now turns to what should have been done at the time of the 
First Restatement, and how we should proceed going forward. Despite 
forensic analysis demonstrating that the original claims to historical 
authority and precedent made to sell promissory estoppel were not valid, 
one may hear the question posed, why should we care now? Isn’t it all 
water under the bridge? 
The principal response is that when an alleged legal doctrine has been 
sold and propagated on false premises, one is entitled, indeed obligated, 
to reopen the original intellectual and moral case for the doctrine. This is 
particularly true for a fundamental field of Western law that has existed 
for millennia, is closely allied to the preservation of private property 
rights, and thus individual liberty, and has tremendous impact on the long-
term health of the U.S. economy. One is required to examine from first 
principles whether the doctrine is advisable from an equitable and policy 
perspective. 
False claims of historicity no longer serve to immunize the subject from 
fundamental doctrinal inquiry. Williston shut down objection to his 
proposed doctrine of promissory estoppel on the basis that it was not truly 
innovatory whatsoever, that it reflected ancient legal tradition stretching 
back through the mists of time to the Middle Ages. Revelation that the 
emperor in fact has no clothes calls into question the very publication of 
Section 90 by the ALI in the first place. It calls into question the 
                                                     
237. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990) (rejecting the application of 
contract law to the parties’ agreement while holding that First Amendment precluded the application 
of promissory estoppel on facts of the case), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that First 
Amendment does not preclude deciding case based on promissory estoppel, as it constitutes a law of 
general application), remanded to 479 N.W.2d 387 (1992) (applying promissory estoppel to the 
newspaper’s promise in the agreement). 
238. Id. at 388. 
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acquiescence of the American academy to a radical and historically 
unfounded doctrine. 
This Article argues that how we should at this point proceed is 
severalfold. As discussed infra, the first step is to make significantly 
greater affirmative use of the concept of implied unilateral contract in 
purported promissory estoppel cases.239 Second, if, and only if—after 
careful analysis of the policies and practicalities underlying existing 
law—it were to be seen as desirable to create a legal mechanism for parties 
to enter into binding gift promises, we should apply for this purpose the 
time-honored concept of formal contract. 
If both of the foregoing steps are taken, this Article argues that 
promissory estoppel would no longer have a place or proper function in 
American contract law. Concomitant with the foregoing 
recommendations, the third step would therefore be to revise the ALI’s 
Restatement of Contracts accordingly, with an eye toward stating the rules 
of contract law in a manner that is historically founded and true to 
precedent. This would entail eliminating Section 90, returning the 
definition of the term “contract” to its old, familiar form, and a host of 
related changes designed to reverse back out various modifications 
Williston undertook to conform contract law to his concept of promissory 
estoppel. 
Finally, academic analysis of contract should eschew the exaggerated 
and artificial focus on detriment to promisee as the policy touchstone 
underlying the field. As discussed supra, casting the discussion of 
consideration solely in terms of detriment to promisee was a technical 
overrefinement proposed by Langdell, perpetuated by Ames and 
Williston, and has taken on a life of its own.240 It has distracted numerous 
thinkers on the subject from the true policy grounds for the enforcement 
of contract at law, namely to increase the certainty, stability, and 
frequency of mutual exchanges in which each party enjoys a benefit 
exceeding the cost of one’s own performance—in other words, where 
each party enjoys a net benefit measured in terms of their own utility. That 
is the core of contract. That is the reason for its existence. 
A. Conceptual Framework for Deciding Cases 
A brief tabular presentation may aid in organizing the discussion of 
these recommendations in light of common factual permutations which 
arise in practice. 
                                                     
239. See infra section III.A.1. 
240. See supra sections II.A, II.C.1. 
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Prefatorily, it should be noted that in any case where a promisor has 
proposed in reasonably explicit terms an exchange transaction—a stated 
quid and a stated quo—there should be no discussion of promissory 
estoppel whatsoever. Such a case unambiguously falls within classical 
contract law and the promise will be enforceable provided there are no 
fundamental defenses thereto. 
The table below accordingly addresses those other, more troublesome 
circumstances in which one party has made a forward-looking statement 
of intent or anticipation, without explicitly stating any quid pro quo 
arrangement, and another party has chosen to rely detrimentally on that 
statement. The factual predicates (along the two orthogonal axes), and this 
Article’s recommended doctrinal approaches (in the numbered interior 
boxes), are as follows: 
 
Table 1:  
No Explicit Quid Pro Quo 
 
 Benefit to Promisor 
 
No Benefit to 
Promisor 
Definite Promise 1. 
 
Implied Unilateral 
Contract 
 
3. 
 
Formal Contract 
 
Vague “Promise” 2. 
 
Choose either: 
 
Implied Unilateral 
Contract, 
 
or 
 
No Enforcement 
 
4. 
 
No Enforcement 
 
 
1. Definite Promise; Benefit to Promisor 
The first and most important step in addressing “promissory estoppel” 
cases is to make greater affirmative use of the concept of implied 
unilateral contract. A very large number of purported promissory estoppel 
cases need not invoke a novel and artificial doctrine for their resolution 
04 - Alden.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:25 PM 
2018] REVERSING THE RELIANCE REVOLUTION 1661 
 
whatsoever.241 In situations where one party has, without any explicit quid 
pro quo arrangement, nonetheless made a clear, definite promise to 
another, for the purpose of inducing that other party to detrimentally rely 
in a manner which is beneficial to the promisor, the case can and should 
be decided on the basis of implied unilateral contract, i.e., on the basis of 
classical contract law. The concept of implied contract, where there is no 
explicit agreement between the parties but their implicit mutual assent to 
an exchange transaction may reasonably be inferred, has been solidly 
established in Anglo-American contract law for close to half a 
millennium.242 An implied unilateral contract is one in which the promisor 
implicitly or constructively seeks not a promise in return, but rather 
specific action or forbearance by the promisee in reliance upon the 
promise.243 
It may be objected that a promisor may have made such a promise for 
such purpose, not out of any assent to an exchange transaction, but 
precisely to avoid being legally bound. The promisor may avoid stating 
an explicit quid pro quo arrangement in order to induce promisee’s 
reliance while simultaneously hoping to preclude the promisee from later 
claiming the existence of an actual mutual agreement. How should such 
cases be handled? 
Cases of this type pose no insurmountable difficulty. Courts and juries 
have since time immemorial dealt with the practical reality that a party’s 
subjective state of mind, their subjective intent, often cannot be known 
with certainty. Absent an explicit statement or implicit concession of 
intent, courts and juries may rely upon external, objective indicia of 
internal, subjective intent.244 What one should particularly look for in the 
postulated contract case is whether the promisor stood to benefit in some 
manner, either directly or indirectly, tangibly or intangibly, from 
promisee’s reliance on the promise. If so, and depending on the facts and 
circumstances, a fact finder may easily infer from the presence of such 
                                                     
241. Jean Powers has likewise argued that many promissory estoppel cases might be decided on 
the basis of unilateral contract. See Jean Fleming Powers, Promissory Estoppel and Wagging the Dog, 
59 ARK. L. REV. 841, 856–57 (2007). 
242. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 367. 
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing, 
inter alia, an offer which requires acceptance by performance or forbearance of a specified act, though 
no longer using the standard, universally understood term “unilateral contract” to describe such an 
arrangement). 
244. See, for example, Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954), in which the court stated that 
“[i]n the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, ‘We must look to the outward expression of a 
person as manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention.’” (quoting First 
Nat. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937)). See also, e.g., Andrew S. Pollis, The 
Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 435, 436–37, 478–80 (2014) (discussing as a general matter the 
role of the fact finder in drawing inferences from external evidence as to subjective state of mind). 
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benefit that the promisor consciously intended to induce promisee’s 
reliance. And the presence of a benefit to the promisor, coupled with the 
promised benefit to promisee, constitutes an exchange transaction. 
Implied unilateral contract may readily be found in such circumstances. 
Whether the promisor in such a situation wishes to be legally bound is 
immaterial. We would all, quite naturally, be delighted to enjoy benefits 
conferred upon us by others without reciprocal obligation. But such is not 
the world. When we consciously propose an exchange, and the 
counterparty agrees, we are bound under age-old principles of contract 
law to carry through on our commitment so made. Constructive mutual 
assent to an exchange—to contract—is present, whatever self-serving 
wishes one might harbor of fleeing one’s own commitment. A “bad actor” 
who makes a promise, hoping to induce reliance by the promisee to the 
benefit of promisor, without reciprocal obligation, may be understandably 
human in motivation, but compellingly obligated in law.245 
By way of example, an obvious application of implied unilateral 
contract to an area in which promissory estoppel has made an inroad is 
subcontractor bids.246 Historically governed by the rules of classical 
contract law, the subject was reoriented by Roger Traynor of the 
California Supreme Court with his promissory estoppel opinion in 
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.247 The fact pattern at issue there involved a 
bid by a subcontractor (a “sub” in common parlance) submitted to a 
general contractor (a “general”).248 The general relied on the pricing in the 
sub’s bid in drafting and submitting its own general bid for a project.249 
After the general had been awarded the main construction contract, but 
before the general had accepted the sub’s bid, the sub attempted to 
withdraw its bid.250 Traynor enforced the sub’s bid on the basis of 
promissory estoppel.251 
                                                     
245. The foregoing logic is of course applicable a fortiori in cases where the promisor either 
intended to be bound or simply did not give any thought to the question of whether they would be 
bound. The legitimacy of enforcing an implied unilateral contract in such cases is clear. 
246. See generally Dorothy Hemmer Bishop, Comment, The Subcontractor’s Bid: An Option 
Contract Arising Through Promissory Estoppel, 34 EMORY L.J. 421 (1985). 
247. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
248. Id. at 758. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 758–59. 
251. Id. at 760. Traynor’s opinion specifically cited First Restatement Sections 45 and 90 working 
in tandem. Id. at 759–60. Section 45 stated the principle that where there has been an offer for a 
unilateral contract, partial performance by the offeree renders the offer irrevocable for some period, 
giving the offeree a fair chance to complete full performance. That is, it creates an option. 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1932). Williston had 
introduced the concept of promissory estoppel into this provision with the following language: 
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Due to limitations of space, a more complete discussion of the various 
ways in which such subcontractor bids could be addressed must await 
another day. For present purposes, suffice it to say that Traynor could 
easily have reached the same decision, namely enforcement of the sub’s 
bid, on the basis of implied unilateral contract, without any need to reach 
for the novel doctrine of promissory estoppel. It is no great intellectual 
leap to infer that the sub had offered to provide a specific good or service 
at a specific price, hoping that the general would rely on the sub’s pricing 
in crafting its own general bid. Traynor himself made this same 
observation.252 If the sub’s pricing were low, the general’s bid could be 
consequently lower as well. Once the general’s bid were to be accepted 
by the project sponsor, the general would be locked in, and would have 
every incentive to accept the low bid of the sub upon which it had relied. 
This is true for the obvious reason that choosing a higher priced sub bid 
from a different sub would cause the general to earn lower profit or even 
suffer a loss on the overall project. The sub thus made a pricing promise 
for the specific purpose of inducing the general to conduct itself in a 
manner likely to be of benefit to the sub, even though the bargain, the quid 
pro quo, was not stated explicitly. It was implicit. When the general 
submitted its own bid based on the sub’s pricing, the general had 
“performed” its side of an implied unilateral option contract253 in manner 
sufficient to render the sub’s bid irrevocable. This is straightforward 
classical contract law. Traynor chose to innovate doctrinally. He did not 
need to. 
2. Vague “Promise”; Benefit to Promisor 
This Article now turns to the difficult cases, those in which a promisor 
has made a vague, nonspecific statement of intent or anticipation—
arguably a “promise,” arguably not—upon which another has chosen 
detrimentally to rely. 
                                                     
“Moreover, merely acting in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient 
reason for making a promise binding (see § 90).” Id. This was one of Williston’s corollary innovations 
in the First Restatement meant to dovetail with the main promissory estoppel clause in Section 90. 
252. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760. 
253. “An option contract is a promise which meets the requirements for the formation of a contract 
and limits the promisor’s power to revoke an offer.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
A “unilateral” option contract is one in which the option offeror desires and welcomes acceptance 
of the option contract solely by means of the option offeree’s performance, rather than by means of a 
counterpromise by the option offeree. See id. § 30(1), at 84–85. 
An “implied” unilateral option contract is one in which the option offeror has not stated the quid 
pro quo expressly, but where subjective or constructive assent to an exchange transaction—limitation 
of option offeror’s power to revoke an underlying offer in exchange for some performance by the 
option offeree—may be inferred from the parties’ respective conduct. See id. § 4 cmt. a, at 14. 
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As before, we might very well be dealing with a “bad actor” who has 
stated a “promise” in deliberately vague, nonspecific terms for the 
purpose of later being able to dodge any allegation that there was an 
agreement, or indeed any specific promise at all. Given human nature, 
these situations undoubtedly arise frequently in the rough and tumble of 
real world communications. 
However, enforcement of a literally nonexistent promise is highly 
problematic. This is particularly true in view of the practical reality that 
many people carefully word their statements precisely in order not to be 
legally bound—not because they are bad actors, not because they had 
culpable intent—but rather because for good and legitimate reason they 
decline to contract and be bound on a given basis. The right to freedom of 
contract necessarily implies the right to freedom from contract as well. 
Not only bad actors decline to state a specific commitment. Lots of good 
actors do so as well, for entirely justifiable reasons. 
The back and forth of day-to-day verbal interactions among people 
consists to a not insignificant degree of forward-looking statements. The 
proposition that any forward-looking statement of intent or anticipation 
may properly be made the subject of a lawsuit would be radical and 
historically unprecedented. Tort law has long eschewed any such 
extension of liability for good and compelling reason.254 Promissory 
fraud—consciously, deliberately lying at the time of making a promise by 
entering into a commitment one knows at its very inception one has no 
intention of ever performing—is actionable in tort.255 But to drop the 
requisite culpability level for liability on an uncompensated forward-
looking statement below such intent to defraud is fraught with policy risk. 
If everyone could sue anyone who made a forward-looking statement of 
intent or anticipation and then failed to carry through, we could find 
ourselves wandering ever deeper into a litigational swamp. There is little 
to nothing in the formally stated doctrine of promissory estoppel to 
restrain such a development from progressing over time. In the prescient 
words of Morawetz during the First Restatement debate, “[i]f I were a 
judge on reading this section I should not know where to draw the line.”256 
Section 90 contains little in the way of limiting principle. 
Moreover, and of great moral significance in this context—though 
essentially ignored in academic writing on the subject—is the fact that it 
takes two to tango. Every promissory estoppel case involves a conscious, 
deliberate choice by a “promisee” to rely on a “promise.” No one 
                                                     
254. See Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract 
Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 491 (1987). 
255. See generally Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., May 
2006, at 26. 
256. ALI Debate on Section 90, supra note 124, at 100. 
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compelled them to do so. In cases where there is no clear promise 
whatsoever, where the precise nature of that to which the speaker has 
committed him or herself remains ambiguous or undefined, one 
introduces enormous moral hazard into the equation by enabling the 
listener successfully to sue. In times past, it has been thought prudent to 
establish bright legal lines which encourage and enable private parties to 
choose whether to contract, or not, and if so, on what terms. If there are 
no reasonably distinct lines—if even vague, imprecise statements can 
suddenly become the subject of suit—parties will find themselves at 
significantly greater risk of unfair or entirely spurious litigation. 
This Article argues that the correct approach to take to these difficult, 
ambiguous cases, where the “promise” or other forward-looking 
statement is vague and indefinite, is to grasp the nettle and make an 
affirmative decision on the basis of classical contract law—either enforce 
the promise as implied unilateral contract, or do not enforce it on grounds 
of indefiniteness. 
Declining to make that decision, and instead opting for the easy fix of 
promissory estoppel, is a form of intellectual abdication which brings 
damage to the principles and corpus of contract law. If one is willing to 
find for the promisee on the basis of promissory estoppel, one is willing 
to impose a remedy predicated upon whatever it is that promisor said. One 
is, in effect, finding that promisor had made some commitment specific 
and comprehensible enough to induce promisee’s reliance in a reasonably 
foreseeable manner. In other words, one could as easily wrestle directly 
with the issue of indefiniteness and conclude that it is indeed possible to 
ascertain, even if subject to interpolation and inference, the promisor’s 
commitment in a reasonably definite manner. Such a conclusion permits 
a finding of implied unilateral contract. 
By contrast, if, after due deliberation, it is not possible to make out the 
contours of the speaker’s commitment in some reasonably certain manner, 
then it is necessary to conclude that no “promise” has in fact been made 
whatsoever. In such a case, it would be inappropriate to impose a remedy 
against the speaker. The issue need not and should not be decided on the 
basis of promissory estoppel. Classical contract law dictates the result. 
An excellent example to examine in this regard is Blinn v. Beatrice 
Community Hospital and Health Center., Inc.257 In that case, a hospital 
employee nearing retirement age wished to have certainty that he would 
remain employed by Beatrice until retirement.258 Otherwise, he would 
                                                     
257. 708 N.W.2d 235 (Neb. 2006). 
258. Id. at 240. 
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accept an outstanding offer of competing employment elsewhere.259 His 
supervisor responded, “Bob, we’ve got at least five more years of work to 
do.”260 Blinn stayed at Beatrice Hospital, turned down the competing 
offer, and was fired by Beatrice roughly six months later.261 
The court reversed and remanded in Blinn’s favor on the basis of 
promissory estoppel.262 Notably, the court concluded that the supervisor’s 
statement was too vague and indefinite to form the basis of a contractual 
promise, but that indefiniteness is no defense to a promissory estoppel 
claim.263 
This Article submits that this was not a proper basis upon which to 
decide the case. By finding for Blinn, the court was, in effect, concluding 
that the supervisor had in fact made a statement that Blinn could 
reasonably, foreseeably interpret as a commitment to continue his 
employment until retirement. If so, then the court could as easily have 
concluded that the supervisor’s statement, though vaguely worded, was 
sufficiently definite to enforce in contract as a promise.264 The court in 
Blinn could and should have reached its decision on the basis of classical 
contract law rather than promissory estoppel. 
In the hypothetical alternative, if a court faced with similar facts were 
ultimately unable to conclude that the supervisor had made a commitment 
to continue Blinn’s employment through retirement, then there would be 
simply no commitment, hence no promise, and hence no enforcement 
would be appropriate. 
Either way, the result turns on the classical question of whether a 
sufficiently definite commitment has been made by the speaker. No 
recourse to promissory estoppel is necessary. Courts can and should step 
up to the true intellectual issue at the heart of such cases and reach an 
affirmative decision as to definiteness on the basis of classical contract 
law. 
3. Definite Promise; No Benefit to Promisor 
Thus far, this Article has examined situations in which an exchange 
transaction may reasonably be inferred. Such cases may be decided in 
                                                     
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 241. 
262. Id. at 247. 
263. Id. 
264. The case would then become rather like Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 
S.W. 777 (Mo. 1907), in which the court enforced in contract a similarly “squishy” statement by an 
employer. 
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favor of enforcement on the basis of implied unilateral contract. By 
contrast, where promisee’s reliance brings no reasonably cognizable 
benefit to the promisor, or where the promisor has made perfectly clear 
that the promised conduct is unconditional and will occur even if the 
promisee declines to act or forbear in any particular manner, then there 
can be no implied quid pro quo—in Oliver Wendell Holmes’s words, no 
“reciprocal conventional inducement”265—and thus no implied unilateral 
contract. 
Yet there may arise circumstances in which a promisor desires to render 
legally binding a current promise to make a gift of property, or to render 
a service, on a wholly gratuitous basis in the future. Such promises are 
presumably typically made, if ever, either to charitable institutions or to 
family members. How should such cases be handled? 
As an analytic starting point, as discussed supra,266 under classical 
contract law the gratuitous nature of the promise ordinarily renders it 
unenforceable.267 Courts have, however, carved out an exception to the 
consideration requirement for charitable donations due to a judicial policy 
preference in favor thereof.268 Promises of gratuitous transfers to family 
members, as private rather than charitable, do not of course fall within that 
policy rationale and are thus generally not enforceable in contract. If one 
wishes to make a gratuitous intrafamily transfer, one therefore either 
makes a current gift including actual delivery, or complies with the legal 
formalities applicable to voluntary testamentary disposition, namely a will 
or a trust.269 
                                                     
265. HOLMES, supra note 105, at 293–94. 
266. See supra section I.D. 
267. See, e.g., Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861) (gratuitous promise by surviving husband to make 
payments to relatives, in order to give effect to inoperative provisions of wife’s will, was not 
enforceable); Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 101 N.W. 852 (Mich. 1904) (gratuitous promise by father 
to pay off mortgages on land he gifted to daughter not enforceable against his estate); Dougherty v. 
Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94–95 (N.Y. 1919) (gratuitous promissory note from aunt to nephew not 
enforceable against her estate). See generally Melvin Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World 
of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997). 
268. See, e.g., Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 104 A.2d 903, 907 (Del. 1954). That case 
involved a gratuitous personal guarantee of borrowings by a hospital. With the goal of encouraging 
“the massive machinery of benevolence,” wrote the court, “[t]here can be no denying that the strong 
desire on the part of the American courts to favor charitable institutions has established a doctrine 
which once would have been looked upon as legal heresy,” namely that a promise made to a charitable 
institution need not be supported by consideration in order to be enforceable. Id. See generally 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, at 93–94. 
269. It is worth noting in this context that a person may change their will at any time, and many 
forms of trust are freely revocable. A promise pursuant to “formal contract,” as discussed infra, would 
not be revocable and would thus bear significant functional difference to many common forms of 
testamentary disposition. 
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Williston, however, sought to create a mechanism to enforce a promise 
to make a gift in the future, despite the absence of consideration therefor 
and despite the absence of compliance with those legal rules which 
otherwise govern voluntary testamentary disposition. As discussed supra, 
it was in order to create a legal mechanism for creating such binding gift 
promises that Williston justified his proposed doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in debate within the ALI and in the illustrative examples 
furnished with Section 90.270 
Yet promissory estoppel sweeps far too wide, carving a swath of 
destruction through the foundations of contract law like Sherman’s march 
to the sea, in order to achieve such a narrow, discrete, and niche exception 
to the consideration requirement. A better, far more modest, far more 
appropriate solution lies to hand. 
Much has been written on the subject of whether donative promises 
should be enforced at law, with various academics staking out positions 
both pro and con.271 The goal of this Article is not to revisit the totality of 
those arguments. There are numerous reasons to leave the existing rule in 
this regard under classical contract law untouched—meaning that wholly 
gratuitous promises to make a gift in the future would remain 
unenforceable. If, however, upon full reflection, state legislatures were 
ultimately to determine that a mechanism should be created for promisors 
at their will to render such promises to family members enforceable, a 
narrowly tailored, precisely targeted approach would suffice admirably. 
There is no need for the destruction of Georgia. 
A principal concern to be addressed with the enforcement of wholly 
gratuitous intrafamily promises is how terribly easy they are to allege, and 
how easily a jury or court might be misled by a talented fabulist, of which 
human experience proves there are many. Simply declaring gratuitous 
promises to family members, without more, enforceable, could constitute 
a litigational landmine.272 
The obvious solution to that problem is to couple enforceability with a 
requirement that the promisor have reduced the promise to writing, and 
perhaps include specialized language stipulating that the promisor waives 
consideration for the promise. This approach could, if so desired, further 
be limited to intrafamily donative promises, rather than gratuitous 
                                                     
270. See supra section II.C.2.c. 
271. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 267. 
272. There are compelling reasons why property law features safeguards designed to protect donors 
in this regard. Inter vivos gifts generally require delivery, and testamentary gifts by will generally 
require a writing signed in the presence of witnesses. For recent discussion of these formal 
requirements, see generally Adam Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A 
Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 798, 815, 824 (2014). 
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promises to unrelated third parties. A stronger variant would require the 
writing to be notarized. Yet stronger would require the document to have 
been drafted by professional counsel admitted to the bar. Strongest would 
be to require the notarized, professionally drafted promise to be filed with 
a specified public office or court. These latter variants in particular would 
constitute a species of modern day formal contract counterpart, if one will, 
to the red wax seal of yesteryear.273 
It is worth noting in this context that an alternative form of the first, 
least strict of these variants has already been attempted and failed signally. 
During the same period in the mid-1920s that Williston was working on 
crafting the First Restatement, he also encouraged the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to propose the 
Uniform Written Obligations Act. Under that contemplated uniform state 
statute, no consideration would be required for enforcement of a promise 
set forth in a writing which expressly states that the signatory intends to 
be legally bound.274 The statute is only in effect in Pennsylvania.275 
Pennsylvania stands alone. Perhaps the relative informality of the 
suggested approach did not appeal. 
It is thus unclear and may sincerely be doubted whether state 
legislatures—on a nationwide and uniform, rather than ad hoc, minority, 
basis—would have any appetite for creating a legal mechanism to render 
gratuitous formal promises binding. The vast majority of U.S. states have 
abandoned formal contract in whole or in part, and there is little reason to 
suppose them ready to come rushing back home. 
If, however, the temper of the times has changed, and if it comes widely 
to be seen as desirable to create a mechanism for gratuitous formal 
promise, particularly in the intrafamily context, the several discrete, 
limited variants suggested in this Article would be entirely sufficient to 
the purpose. Nothing militates in favor of the gaping, nearly unbounded 
liability principle of promissory estoppel. The various approaches 
suggested here each present a targeted, precise solution for a discrete 
situation, rather than a systemically toxic “cure” which kills the patient.276 
                                                     
273. The variants suggested in this Article, particularly the latter ones, would also represent a 
different and more robust mechanism for indicating and achieving formality than the degenerated 
forms of “seal” which came into practice over the years, such as the mere written initials “L.S.” 
(standing for locus sigilli (place of the seal)). See discussion supra section I.F. 
274. See Hirsch, supra note 272, at 836 n.192. 
275. See Uniform Written Obligations Act, 33 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6 (2018) (enacted 1927). 
276. It is highly noteworthy in this connection that England has retained the use of formal, sealed 
contracts to render gratuitous promises binding, and has rejected the radical concept of promissory 
estoppel. See MILSOM, supra note 17, at 356. 
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4. Vague “Promise”; No Benefit to Promisor 
Where someone has not made a clear, definite promise, but instead only 
a vague forward-looking statement of intent or anticipation, for which 
they receive nothing by way of recompense, but another chooses 
detrimentally to rely on that statement, it should go without saying that 
enforcement of that statement as a contractual “promise” would be 
inappropriate. 
Interestingly, Section 90 would permit such enforcement, if a judge 
believes that it was reasonably foreseeable that the “promisee” might rely 
thereon, and the judge in their unfettered discretion deems enforcement 
necessary to avoid injustice. Though it may be unlikely that a judge would 
come to such a conclusion, there is nothing in Section 90 that would pose 
an impediment thereto. Section 90 is facially overbroad. Cases in this 
category should be denied enforcement, on a straightforward classical 
contract law analysis. 
5. Reliance by Third Party 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Section 90’s facial overbreadth 
appears in its Restatement (Second) incarnation, which purports to extend 
potential liability to third parties—i.e., not the promisee—who have relied 
on a “promise” that was not even made to them.277 Classical contract law 
restricts enforcement by third parties to “creditor beneficiaries” and 
“donee beneficiaries.” The former are, broadly, parties to whom the 
promisor owed a preexisting legal duty, which the promisor now seeks to 
fulfill through a new contract with another party.278 The latter are parties 
whom the promisor consciously sought to benefit. 
New Section 90 purports to sweep those limitations aside. A 
“promisor” who has made a statement, which need not meet the 
definiteness requirement of classical contract, may potentially face 
liability to third parties to whom the promisor owes no preexisting legal 
duty, and to whom the promisor was not even speaking, if it was 
                                                     
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
278. A quintessential example of such a situation is where a landlord has contracted with a tenant 
in a lease agreement to build or renovate space on the property for the tenant. The landlord hires a 
contractor to perform the work landlord owes under the lease. Depending on the circumstances, the 
tenant might be able, as a third party creditor beneficiary of the construction contract, to sue the 
contractor directly for any breach by the contractor. See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Balfour Beatty, Inc., 
994 F. Supp. 634 (D.V.I. 1998) (permitting tenant as third-party beneficiary to sue contractor for 
storm damage to building). 
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reasonably foreseeable that such third parties might rely on that 
statement.279 
The consequent hypothetical possibility of “mass liability” under 
Section 90 was painted out by Metzger and Phillips in a 1989 article.280 
They postulated a situation in which a large corporation states publicly 
that it does not anticipate a factory closure, but later due to poor economic 
circumstances proceeds to shutter the plant.281 For example, anyone in 
town who, in reliance on the company’s earlier public statement, chose 
not to sell their houses and pursue employment in another region, might 
attempt a claim under Section 90’s third party prong.282 Nothing on the 
face of Section 90 would stand in the way of such a result. 
This Article submits, fevered dreams of the plaintiffs’ bar 
notwithstanding, that a purported liability provision of such facial 
overbreadth has no historical foundation nor proper place in Anglo-
American contract law doctrine. 
B. Bringing the Restatement into Line with Its True Function 
Significant responsibility for returning contract law to its true 
foundation lies with the ALI, whose restatements have failed to adhere to 
its asserted mission of stating the law as it is. The ALI should accordingly 
undertake a revision to the Restatement (Second) with several objectives. 
Most importantly, Section 90, which sets forth the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, should simply be deleted. The separate subrule at the 
end of Section 90, which applies only to charitable subscriptions and 
marriage settlements,283 could be turned into a discrete, limited, 
categorical exception to the consideration requirement for such promises. 
So-called “promissory estoppel” cases should be decided on the basis of 
classical contract law, in particular whether the parties’ conduct has given 
rise to an implied unilateral contract. 
Likewise, Section 87(2), which provides that an offer can be binding 
as an option contract on the basis of promissory estoppel284—rather than 
on the classical basis of mutual assent and consideration to the option—
should be deleted. Option contracts should be addressed as they are in 
                                                     
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
280. Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 42 SW. 
L.J. 931, 967 (1989). 
281. Id. at 968. 
282. Id. 
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
284. Id. § 87(2), at 229. 
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classical contract law, including the ability of courts to find an implied 
option contract where the facts warrant such a conclusion. 
Next, Section 1’s definition of the term “contract”285 should be 
modified to take on its historically founded, legitimate form. Such 
definition would include reference both to the “agreement” of the parties 
and to the presence of “consideration.” The definition given by Tanfield 
in the seminal Slade’s Case, or any reasonable equivalent thereof, could 
serve this purpose admirably: “a mutual agreement between the parties for 
something to be performed by the defendant in consideration of some 
benefit which must depart from the plaintiff, or of some labour or 
prejudice which must be sustained by the plaintiff.”286 The essence of the 
matter is that the definition requires both mutual assent and mutual 
consideration—that is, the parties must have agreed to an exchange 
transaction in which each party acts or forbears or changes a legal relation 
at the request of the other. In other words, there must be a bargain, a deal. 
The definition of “contract” in Section 1, and the comments thereto, 
should also make clear that a bargain transaction between two parties 
where both sides perform immediately—a so-called “executed” 
contract—is indeed every bit as much a contract as making a promise to 
do or deliver something in the future—a so-called “executory” contract. 
Historically, this has been fully understood.287 It would also be consistent 
with the approach taken by the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
recognizes that a “contract for sale” includes a “present sale of goods,” 
i.e., “a sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract.”288 The 
essence of contract is a voluntary exchange transaction between two 
parties, irrespective of whether it is performed immediately or only with 
some delay. 
A host of other changes consonant in spirit should be undertaken 
throughout the Restatement (Second) where it is evident that definitions, 
rules, and comments have been stated anomalously in a manner which 
accommodates the discordant concept of promissory estoppel but does 
disservice to traditional, time-honored principles of contract law.289 
                                                     
285. Id. § 1, at 5. 
286. Slade’s Case, supra note 45, at 429 (remarks of Tanfield, J.). 
287. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *443; STORY, supra note 212, at 8. 
288. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). 
289. These include without limitation: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (requirement of a bargain); § 17 cmt. e (informal contract without bargain); § 34 cmt. D 
(reliance and appropriate remedies); § 50 cmt. b (acceptance by performance); § 72 cmt. b 
(substantive bases for enforcement); § 79 cmts. b, f (benefit and detriment, mutuality); ch. 4, topic 2, 
intro. note (bases for enforcement, omitted cases); § 87(2) and § 87 cmt. e (reliance); and § 89 cmt. d 
(reliance). 
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C. Recursion to Mutual Net Benefit as the Crux of Contract 
Finally, academic analysis of contract should eschew the exaggerated 
and artificial focus on detriment to promisee as the policy touchstone 
underlying the field. As discussed supra, casting the discussion of 
consideration solely in terms of detriment to promisee was a technical 
overrefinement proposed by Langdell, perpetuated by Ames, and has 
taken on a life of its own.290 It has distracted numerous thinkers on the 
subject from the true policy grounds for the enforcement of contract at 
law,291 namely to increase the certainty, stability and frequency of mutual 
exchanges in which each party enjoys a benefit exceeding the cost of one’s 
own performance—in other words, where each party enjoys a net benefit 
measured in terms of their own utility. That is the core of contract. That 
is the reason for its existence. 
CONCLUSION 
The past century of academic writing and judicial decisions in the field 
of contract law have been clouded and confused by the thankless task of 
attempting to reconcile two not only grossly incompatible but indeed 
diametrically opposed propositions—the age-old requirements of mutual 
assent and mutual consideration in classical contract law, versus the 
insistence of the novel and artificial “doctrine of promissory estoppel” that 
neither assent nor consideration is requisite in order to render promise 
enforceable. A house divided against itself shall not stand. The American 
academy should return to the true and historically founded basis of 
contract law, namely the enforcement of mutual exchange transactions, 
and eschew the attempt of Williston, Corbin, and their latter-day 
confederates to alter the doctrines of contract law by main force. 
Conscientious application of the principles of classical contract law, 
particularly implied unilateral contract, combined with reinvigoration of 
formal contract for future-oriented intrafamily donative transfers, can and 
should be used to resolve so-called promissory estoppel cases. Section 90 
should be withdrawn. 
 
                                                     
290. See supra sections II.A, II.C.1. 
291. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, supra note 88. 
